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## Did the Credit Crunch in Japan Affect Household Welfare? An Augmented Euler Equation Approach Using Type 5 Tobit Model\*

by

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#### Abstract

We investigate whether the credit crunch in Japan affected household welfare and the manner in which it did. We augment the theoretical framework of a consumption Euler equation with endogenous credit constraints and estimate it with household panel data for 1993–1999, generating several empirical findings. First, a small portion of the people faced credit constraints in Japan before and after the financial crisis in 1997. Accordingly, our results reject the standard consumption Euler equation. Second, the credit crunch affected household welfare negatively, albeit not seriously, after 1997. Our results corroborate that the credit crunch in Japan was supply-driven.

Keywords: Credit crunch; Consumption Euler equation; Credit constraints

JEL Classification Numbers: D91; E21

#### 1. Introduction

In Japan, the collapse of mega-banks in 1997 increased regulatory pressure, market scrutiny, and the distress of the financial system, thereby causing a crisis in the domestic financial sector (Woo, 2003). The financial crisis in Japan is often referred to as a typical example of a "credit crunch," which is conventionally defined as a sharp decline in bank loans caused by supply factors such as risk-based capital standards imposed on banks.<sup>1</sup> There is a large emerging body of studies that questions whether the credit crunch in Japan constrained firm investments, and if so, the manner in which it did so. However, the derived empirical results are different, ranging from no evidence of a credit crunch to clear evidence of a crunch in 1997 or even earlier (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2006; Hayashi and Prescott, 2002; Hori, Saito, and Ando, 2006; Hosono, 2006; Ito and Sasaki, 2002; Motonishi and Yoshikawa, 1999; Woo, 2003).<sup>2</sup>

However, there are no clear explanations for the manner in which the financial crisis and credit crunch affected the welfare of Japanese households.<sup>3</sup> Casual evidence shows that the negative impact of the credit crunch in Japan was serious at the household level; for example, the growth rate of the credit supply of private banks to individuals shrunk

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> However, such a crunch can also be caused by a slump in demand.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For example, Peek and Rosengren (2000) indicate that the credit crunch in Japan became a serious issue even around 1993, by finding that Japanese banks reduced their commercial real estate lending in the US where the financial crisis in Japan was an external event. Ito and Sasaki (2002) corroborate this view. In contrast, Woo (2003) finds empirical support for only the credit crunch experienced in 1997.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Kang and Sawada (2007) examine the manner in which the credit crunch in Korea affected household welfare in 1997 and 1998.

significantly in the 1990s and even became negative in 1992 and 1993 (Ogawa, 2003). In addition, the number of applications for individual bankruptcies jumped from 43,545 in 1993 to 122,741 in 1999 (Figure 1). Thus, it is natural to hypothesize that this sharp increase in individual bankruptcies was caused by the problems in the financial sector. There are many newspaper articles reporting that the credit crunch in Japan damaged small firms disproportionately because unlike large listed firms, the only source of their external funding for investments was still bank loans. Accordingly, it has been said that many owners of small firms or businesses went bankrupt after facing a steep decline in bank loans during the credit crunch. Although this credit crunch can be assumed to have negatively affected the welfare of small-firm owners and their employees, it is not categorically clear whether the credit crunch really affected small firms disproportionately. For example, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) concluded that small firms could rely on their own cash and deposits to weather the sharp decline in bank loans. Moreover, the negative impact on employment was actually smaller than the original prediction; further, it was not comparable to the impact of other major economic crises such as the Great Depression (Genda, 2003; Hoshi, 2006). The responses of firms, households, and the government appeared to have played important roles in coping with the macroeconomic crisis. Hence, unless a thorough empirical study is undertaken, the overall social impact of the credit crunch is not necessarily clear.

By addressing the extent to which households were affected by the crisis, this study aims to overcome the shortcoming in the existing studies; we achieve this by providing more information on the Japanese financial crisis. In our empirical analysis, household-level panel data collected from 1993 to 1999 are used. We estimate a consumption Euler equation that is augmented by endogenously imposed credit constraints using a switching regression or Type 5 Tobit model. The methodology permits us to derive a density function of the probabilities of binding credit constraints for each year, which makes it possible to quantify the seriousness of the credit crunch at the household level. In order to identify whether the credit crunch was driven by supply or demand, we also estimate Kimball's prudence parameter (1990) before and during the credit crunch using the approach suggested by Lee and Sawada (2007); this approach is an extension of the Euler equation approach proposed by Dynan (1993). A change in the prudence parameter characterizes a change in households' saving behavior and thus indicates the demand for credit.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical framework based on which the econometric framework is derived in Section 3. Section 4 presents a discussion of the data and empirical results, and Section 5 concludes the paper.

#### 2. The Model Framework

Under the financial crisis, households faced the problem of reconciling realized income shortfall with a desirable level of stable consumption. This problem can be theoretically captured as a problem of intertemporal consumption smoothing under a stochastic income process. Households have devised several methods, such as those involving self-insurance and mutual insurance, to cope with the ex-post risks of negative income shocks and to protect their levels of consumption.

In this paper, we focus on a particular measure that households use to cope with hardship—credit. Households can utilize credit to smooth consumption by reallocating future resources for current consumption. The lack of consumption insurance can be compensated for by having access to a credit market (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989). However, households may be constrained from borrowing for a variety of reasons such as asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The existence of credit constraints has important negative impacts on the risk-coping ability of poor households. For example, faced with a shortfall in the real income, credit-constrained households may be forced to reduce consumption expenditure since credit cannot be used as insurance. A credit crunch could magnify this negative impact of

credit constraints. This channel may explain the mechanisms of the so-called consumption slump and the resultant deflationary spirals in Japan (Krugman, 1998). Interestingly, Olney (1999) also showed that, given the high cost of default, reducing consumption was the only viable strategy of American households against the recession in 1930. Accordingly, consumer spending collapsed in 1930, turning a minor recession into the Great Depression. While credit constraints were self-imposed by households in the case of the Great Depression, there appears to be a common element of reinforced credit constraints in recessions in the US and Japan.

#### 2.1 The Model of an Augmented Euler Equation

In order to formalize the role of credit, following Zeldes (1989) and Deaton (1991), we construct a model that provides optimal consumer behavior under uncertain income and potential credit constraints. Suppose a household *i*'s decision-maker has a concave instantaneous utility  $U(\bullet)$  of the household consumption  $C_t$ . The household then has to choose a value of  $C_{it}$  with a subjective discount rate  $\delta$  such that the discounted lifetime utility is maximized, which is subject to intertemporal budget constraints with the interest rate *r*. Generally, when the household income is stochastic, analytical solutions to this problem cannot be derived (Zeldes, 1989). However, in order to obtain an optimum solution, we can derive a set of first-order necessary conditions by forming a value function and a Bellman equation. Let  $\lambda$  represent the Lagrange multiplier associated with credit constraint  $A + y - C + z \ge 0$  where A is the household asset at the beginning of the period, y represents the stochastic household income, and the maximum amount of credit possible for this household is represented by z.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> When *z* is sufficiently large, the household can lend and borrow freely at a rate of interest *r*. A case of complete borrowing constraint, in which a household cannot borrow at all, can be represented by z = 0.

On combining the envelope condition derived from the first-order conditions, we obtain a consumption Euler equation that is augmented by the possibility of a binding credit constraint:

(1)  

$$U'(C_{it}) = E_{t} \left[ U'(C_{it+1}) \left( \frac{1+r_{it}}{1+\delta_{i}} \right) \right] + \lambda_{it},$$

$$A_{it} + y_{it} - C_{it} + z_{it} \ge 0 \quad \text{if } \lambda_{it} = 0,$$

$$A_{it} + y_{it} - C_{it} + z_{it} = 0 \quad \text{if } \lambda_{it} > 0.$$

#### 2.2 Measuring Welfare Losses from Binding Credit Constraints

This augmented Euler equation (1) was first derived by Zeldes (1989). The term  $\lambda$  is equal to the increase in the expected lifetime utility that would result if the current constraint were relaxed by one unit. Since the household is constrained from borrowing more, but not from saving more,  $\lambda$  assumes a positive sign. Accordingly, we can interpret the Lagrange multiplier  $\lambda$  as an indicator of the negative welfare effects generated by binding credit constraints (Kang and Sawada, 2007). Note that the Lagrange multiplier  $\lambda_{it}$  is a negative function of the current income  $y_{it}$ . Given other variables, an increase in the current income of a credit-constrained household leads to a decline in the marginal utility of current consumption, thereby causing the Lagrange multiplier to decline. This theoretical property provides us with a basis for testing the validity of the theoretical framework.

#### 3. Econometric Framework

Our econometric framework aims to test the implications of the augmented Euler equation (1). Here, we employ two different empirical strategies. First, following Zeldes (1989), we suppose that households form their rational expectations and that utility is described by the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, i.e.,  $U(C_{it}) = C_{it}^{1-\gamma} (1-\gamma)^{-1} \exp(\theta_{it})$ , where  $\theta$  represents the household size and tastes. Then, equation (1) becomes

$$(2) \quad \hat{C}_{it+1} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left\{ \theta_{it+1} - \theta_{it} + \log \left[ 1 + \frac{\lambda_{it}}{E_t \left( C_{it+1}^{-\gamma} \exp(\theta_{it+1}) \left( \frac{1+r_{it}}{1+\delta_i} \right) \right)} \right] - \log(1+e_{it+1}) + \log \left( \frac{1+r_{it}}{1+\delta_i} \right) \right\},$$

where  $\hat{C}$  is the consumption growth rate, and *e* denotes the household's expectation error with  $E(e_{it+1}|I_t)$ , with  $I_t$  being the information set available at time *t*.

The second approach follows the approach adopted by Lee and Sawada (2007), which is an extension of Dynan (1993), by including endogenous credit constraints. As shown by Lee and Sawada (2007), we can take a second-order Taylor approximation of equation (1) to obtain

(3) 
$$\hat{C}_{it+1} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{r_{it} - \delta_i}{1 + r_{it}} \right) + \frac{\rho}{2} \left( \hat{C}_{it+1} \right)^2 - \left( \frac{1 + \delta_i}{1 + r_{it}} \right) \frac{\lambda_{it}}{C_{it} U''(C_{it})} + e_{it+1}$$

where  $\rho \equiv -C(U^{"'}/U^{"})$  is the coefficient of relative prudence, as elaborated by Kimball (1990).

In the case of either approach, the approximated estimable equation becomes

(4) 
$$\hat{C}_{it+1} = X_{it}\beta + f(\lambda_{it}) + v_{it},$$

where X includes the determinants of household tastes,  $f(\bullet)$  is an increasing function that takes zero if  $\lambda$  becomes 0, and  $v_{it}$  indicates a well-behaved stochastic error term. In order to control for the changes in preferences and household characteristics, such items as household size, age of the respondent, and age squared were included in X (Zeldes, 1989). Further, in the second approach, X includes the squared consumption growth rate. In consumption growth equation (3), it is natural to regard that the squared consumption growth and error terms as being correlated. Thus, we follow Dynan (1993) and treat the squared consumption growth term as an endogenous variable.

Now, let  $C^*$  represent the optimal consumption in the absence of a current credit constraint.  $C^* = C$  if the credit constraint is not binding, and  $C^* > C$  if the credit constraint is binding. Then, we define the gap between optimal consumption under the perfect credit accessibility and cash in hand without credit constraints, i.e.,  $H = C^* - (A + y + z)$ . Further, following Hayashi (1985) and Jappelli (1990), we assume that the conditional expectation of optimal consumption  $C^*$  can be approximated by a quadratic function. Hence, the reduced form of the optimal consumption  $C^*$  can be expressed as a linear function of observables, such as current income, wealth, and age, as well as the quadratic terms of these variables. The maximum amount of borrowing is also assumed to be a linear function of the same variables. Accordingly, we have a reduced-form equation

(5) 
$$H_{it} = W_{it}\beta_W + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where *W* includes the assets, income, and determinants of optimal consumption and maximum loan values, and  $\varepsilon$  is an error term that captures unobserved elements and measurement error.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Here, two factors determine whether or not the constraint is binding (Jappelli, 1990). The first factor is the demand for credit, represented by the difference between the cash in hand and consumption, while the second factor is the number of financial intermediaries that are willing to offer credit to this individual, denoted by z.

From equations (4) and (5), we can derive the following econometric model of the augmented Euler equation with the following endogenous credit constraints:

(6)  

$$\hat{C}_{it+1} = X_{it}\beta + f(\lambda_{it}) + v_{it+1},$$

$$\lambda_{it}' > 0 \quad if \quad H_{it} \ge 0,$$

$$\lambda_{it}' = 0 \quad if \quad H_{it} < 0,$$

$$H_{it} = W_{it}\beta_{W} + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

#### 3.1 Exogenous versus Endogenous Credit Constraints

The conventional empirical approach to estimate equation (6) (Zeldes, 1989; Morduch, 1990) ignores the endogeneity of the Lagrange multiplier and exogenously splits the sample into those households that are likely to be credit-constrained, i.e.,  $\lambda_t > 0$ , and those are not likely to be credit-constrained, i.e.,  $\lambda_t = 0$ , by using observable household characteristics. Zeldes (1989) splits the sample based on the wealth-to-income ratio.

The exogenous split approach, however, has two problems (Garcia, Lusardi, and Ng, 1997, p. 158; Hu and Schiantarelli, 1998, p. 466–467). First, it is unlikely that a single variable, such as the wealth-to-income ratio, would serve as a sufficient statistic of a consumer's ability to borrow. Usually, lenders screen credit applicants based on multiple factors. Second, if the variables used as the criteria for splitting a sample were correlated with the unobserved factors in consumption growth, this correlation would generate a sample selection problem. Accordingly, sample selection bias should be controlled for properly.

#### 3.2 Type 5 Tobit Model with Observed Regimes

In order to overcome these two issues, an alternative approach elaborated by Jappelli (1990) is adopted; this approach constructs a qualitative response model of an endogenous

credit constraint by defining the indicator variable of a credit constraint, which would take the value of one if the credit constraints are binding, and zero otherwise. Jappelli, Pischeke, and Souleles (1998) combined this model of endogenous credit constraint with a consumption Euler equation. Accordingly, in order to estimate a system of equations (6), we can combine the endogenous credit constraint approach of Jappelli (1990) with the augmented Euler equation.

Let the function of the Lagrange multiplier  $f(\lambda)$  be a piecewise linear function of a set of variables Z with a coefficient vector  $\psi$  that is specific to the credit constraint status. With subscripts N and C representing the credit non-constrained and constrained groups, respectively, the estimable augmented Euler equation (6) can be rewritten as follows:

(7) 
$$\hat{C}_{it+1} = X_{it}\beta_X + (1-\delta_{it})Z_{it}\psi_N + \delta_{it}Z_{it}\psi_C + v_{it},$$

(8) 
$$\delta_{it} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } H_{it} \ge 0\\ 0 & \text{if } H_{it} < 0 \end{cases}$$

$$H_{it} = W_{it} \beta_W + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

The testable restriction of our framework is that the elements of the coefficient vector for the non-constrained group in equation (7), i.e.,  $\psi_N$ , are all zero. We assume that errors follow a joint normal distribution with zero means and the following covariance matrix:

(9) 
$$\begin{pmatrix} v_{Nit} \\ \varepsilon_{it} \end{pmatrix} \sim N \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} \sigma^2 & \sigma_{v\varepsilon} \\ \sigma^2_{v\varepsilon} & 1 \end{bmatrix}.$$

If the sign of *H* is observable, the model can be estimated by the Type 5 Tobit model with observed regime (Amemiya 1995, p. 399–408). The Type 5 Tobit model explicitly considers

the endogenous sample selection bias arising from the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of equation (7). We can consistently estimate the parameters in the Euler and credit-constrained equations by maximizing the following log-likelihood function:

$$l_{t}(\beta_{X},\psi_{N},\psi_{C},\beta_{W},\sigma,\sigma_{v\varepsilon})$$

$$(10) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (1-\delta_{it}) \ln\{f(v_{it} \mid H_{it} < 0) \operatorname{Prob}(H_{it} < 0)\} + \delta_{it} \ln\{f(v_{it} \mid H_{it} \ge 0) \operatorname{Prob}(H_{it} \ge 0)\}$$

$$=\sum_{i=1}^{n} (1-\delta_{ii}) \ln \left\{ \left[ \frac{1}{\sigma} \phi \left( \frac{v_{ii}}{\sigma} \right) \right] \Phi \left( \frac{-W_{ii} \beta_{W} - \frac{\sigma_{v\varepsilon}}{\sigma^{2}} v_{ii}}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{\sigma_{v\varepsilon}^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}}} \right) \right\} + \delta_{ii} \ln \left\{ \left[ \frac{1}{\sigma} \phi \left( \frac{v_{ii}}{\sigma} \right) \right] \left[ 1 - \Phi \left( \frac{-W_{ii} \beta_{W} - \frac{\sigma_{v\varepsilon}}{\sigma^{2}} v_{ii}}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{\sigma_{v\varepsilon}^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}}} \right) \right] \right\}$$

where  $\phi(\bullet)$  and  $\Phi(\bullet)$  represent the density and cumulative distribution functions of standard normal distribution, respectively. We take the OLS estimation results as the starting values and set the auxiliary parameters ( $\sigma$ ,  $\sigma_{v\varepsilon}$ ) to be (1, 0) initially. The estimated parameters are then employed as the updated initial values to re-estimate all the parameters.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Alternatively, we can estimate the Type 5 Tobit model of equations (7) and (8) by using the Heckman and Lee's two-step procedure. See, for example, Nawata and Nagase (1996) and Nawata (2004).

#### 3.3 Type 5 Tobit Model with Unobserved Regimes I

However, a precise measurement of the credit constraint is not straightforward. A direct approach involves utilizing the information on a household's willingness and ability to obtain credit (Jappelli, 1990; Jappelli, Pischeke, and Souleles, 1998). Generally, household-level data on credit availability is not available in standard household surveys (Scott, 2000) because the credit constraint status cannot be identified by only considering the amount of attained credit. Even in cases where the indicator variable for the credit constraint is not observed, we can apply the estimation method of a switching model with unknown regimes. Following a recent study by Garcia, Lusardi, and Ng (1997), we estimate the Euler equation augmented by endogenous credit constraints as a switching regression model. Although we cannot observe H directly, we can estimate the probability of being credit-constrained jointly with other parameters in Euler equations by maximizing the following log-likelihood function:

#### (11)

$$L_{t}(\beta_{X},\psi_{N},\psi_{C},\beta_{W},\sigma,\sigma_{v\varepsilon}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \log \left\{ \left[ \frac{1}{\sigma} \phi\left(\frac{v_{ii}}{\sigma}\right) \right] \Phi\left(\frac{-W_{ii}\beta_{W} - \frac{\sigma_{v\varepsilon}}{\sigma^{2}}v_{ii}}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{\sigma_{v\varepsilon}^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}}}\right) + \left[ \frac{1}{\sigma} \phi\left(\frac{v_{ii}}{\sigma}\right) \right] \left[ 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{-W_{ii}\beta_{W} - \frac{\sigma_{v\varepsilon}}{\sigma^{2}}v_{ii}}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{\sigma_{v\varepsilon}^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}}}\right) \right] \right\}.$$

While the nonlinearity of the system made convergence difficult, we achieved interior solutions from the OLS starting values and the random attempts that were made to ascertain better feasible initial values. We again set auxiliary parameters ( $\sigma$ ,  $\sigma_{v\varepsilon}$ ) as (1, 0) initially. In order to re-estimate all the parameters, we employ the estimated parameters as the initial values.

According to the testable restriction derived from the theoretical result of augmented Euler equation (1), for the non-constrained group, the elements of the coefficient vector, i.e.,  $\psi_N$ , are all zero, while, for the constrained group, the elements of the coefficient vector, i.e.,  $\psi_C$ , are non-zero.

#### 3.4 Type 5 Tobit Model with Unobserved Regimes II

We also estimate the augmented Euler equation with unobserved regimes by letting the parameter vector  $\beta_X$  differ depending on the regime. In this case, we have the following econometric model which was employed by Garcia et al. (1997) and Kang and Sawada (2007):

(12) 
$$\hat{C}_{it+1} = X_{it}\beta_N + Z_{it}\psi_N + v_{Nit} \quad if \quad H_{it} < 0,$$

(13) 
$$\hat{C}_{it+1} = X_{it}\beta_C + Z_{it}\psi_C + v_{Cit} \quad if \quad H_{it} \ge 0,$$

(14) 
$$H_{it} = W_{it} \beta_W + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

As earlier, the testable restriction of our framework is that the elements of the coefficient vector in equation (12), i.e.,  $\psi_N$ , are all zero for the non-constrained group. We assume that errors follow a joint normal distribution with zero means and the following covariance matrix:

(15) 
$$\begin{pmatrix} v_{Nit} \\ v_{Cit} \\ \varepsilon_{it} \end{pmatrix} \sim N \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_N^2 & \sigma_{NC} & \sigma_{N\varepsilon} \\ \sigma_{CN} & \sigma_C^2 & \sigma_{C\varepsilon} \\ \sigma_{\varepsilon N} & \sigma_{\varepsilon C} & \sigma_{\varepsilon}^2 \end{bmatrix}.$$

For identification, we assume that  $\sigma_{\varepsilon}^2 = 1$ . In addition, note that  $\sigma_{NC}$  and  $\sigma_{CN}$  are not identifiable because only one of the two regimes can be observed. All other parameters can be identified.

Although we cannot observe *H* directly, we can estimate the probability of being creditconstrained jointly with other parameters in Euler equations by maximizing the following loglikelihood function:

(16)

$$L_{t}(\beta_{N},\beta_{C},\psi_{N},\psi_{C},\beta_{W},\sigma_{N},\sigma_{C},\sigma_{N\varepsilon},\sigma_{C\varepsilon}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \log \left\{ \left[ \frac{1}{\sigma_{N}} \phi\left(\frac{v_{Nit}}{\sigma_{N}}\right) \right] \Phi\left(\frac{-W_{it}\beta_{W} - \frac{\sigma_{N\varepsilon}}{\sigma_{N}^{2}}v_{Nit}}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{\sigma_{N\varepsilon}^{2}}{\sigma_{N}^{2}}}}\right) + \left[ \frac{1}{\sigma_{C}} \phi\left(\frac{v_{Cit}}{\sigma_{C}}\right) \right] \left[ 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{-W_{it}\beta_{W} - \frac{\sigma_{C\varepsilon}}{\sigma_{C}^{2}}v_{Cit}}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{\sigma_{C\varepsilon}^{2}}{\sigma_{C}^{2}}}}\right) \right] \right\}$$

#### 4. Data and Estimation Results

This paper uses the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers data set from 1993 to 1999, which was collected by the Institute for Research on Household Economics. The survey was conducted in all Japanese prefectures. The data comprised the responses to multipurpose surveys with household and individual modules. The initial survey in 1993 was completed by 1,500 women between the ages of 24 and 35. After excluding the observations with missing information, we constructed a balanced panel data set that comprised the survey responses of 807 women. The definitions and summary statistics of the variables are provided in Table 1.

#### 4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this paper. Household income is calculated as the total family income before tax minus the asset income such as the returns from securities. The income is then deflated by the consumer price index. The surveys asked about detailed income components in the calendar year immediately before the interview. By following Zeldes (1989, p. 326), we utilize this initial income variable as the only element of Z when we implement econometric analysis. This also mitigates the endogeneity bias arising from the correlation between the initial income and the error term. According to Table 1, real household income constantly increased from 4.8 million yen in 1993 to 6 million yen in 1998; however, it stayed almost unchanged in 1999.

With respect to total expenditure, questions were asked about the family expenditure in the month of September each year. We multiplied this expenditure figure by 12 and deflated it by the consumer price index. Real annual household expenditure also increased from 1.74 million yen in 1993 to 2.17 million yen in 1999.

The household asset variable is obtained as the total amount of deposits, bonds, and securities owned by the family. It increased from 2.84 million yen in 1993 to 4.22 million yen in 1999. The amount of outstanding debt is equal to the sum of housing and other loans. It increased sharply from 3.11 million yen in 1993 to 7.56 million yen in 1999. This may be due to life cycle effects—the respondents were at an early stage of their lives, and thus they were likely to accumulate debts to finance housing and other investments. In fact, the housing ownership rate is very high. Initially, the rate was 60% in 1993, which increased to almost 70% in 1999. Note, however, that this increase in debt does not necessarily imply that credit constraints are less binding, since the demand for credit might have increased significantly at the same time.

In order to characterize the respondents further, we included marital status and education variables. While approximately 27% of the surveyed women were single in 1993, 17% remained single in 1999. With respect to the education level in the sample, 43% of the respondents were senior high school graduates; 19%, vocational school graduates; 20%, junior college graduates; and 12%, college or university graduates.

Finally, city size was categorized into three groups, i.e., the major cities with more than 0.5 million people, other middle- or small-sized cities, and other areas such as towns and

villages. It is notable that approximately 25% and 60% of the respondents were living in major and middle-sized cities, respectively.

#### 4.2 Variables Used in the Analysis

Throughout the estimation of consumption Euler equations, we consider the annual growth rate of total expenditures as a dependent variable.<sup>7</sup> Independent variables include the respondent's age and age squared, co-residence dummy, the first difference of the household size, and initial household income with a slope dummy variable for credit-constrained and non-constrained households. The co-residence dummy variable is exclusively for single women; this takes the value of one if a single woman lives with others. In the final specification based on equation (3), we follow Dynan (1993) and Lee and Sawada (2007) and include the squared consumption growth rate, treating this variable as endogenous.

With respect to the credit constraint equation, the explanatory variables are as follows: household income, household income squared, asset, asset squared, debt, debt squared, age, age squared, marital status, household size, and the education and indicator variables for city size. We also include the co-residence dummy for single women. Following Jappelli's probit analysis of the credit constraint equation (1990), the dependent variable should be a credit constraint dummy that takes the value of one if the credit constraint is binding, and zero otherwise. Notably, the 1993 survey includes a special section that precisely measures credit constraint by directly asking about a household's willingness and ability to obtain credit. In our sample, the percentage of the households facing credit constraint is approximately 8% in 1993 (Table 1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> This variable is computed by taking the first difference of log real household expenditure.

#### 4.3 Estimation Results I: The Case of Observed Regimes

By using the 1993 survey in which the credit constraints can be identified directly from the data set, we summarize the estimation results of Euler equation (7), credit-constrained equation (8), and the econometric model that maximizes the likelihood function in equation (10).

Table 2 reports the key empirical findings of the estimated Euler equation (7) by using OLS. Although the coefficients on the initial income for the constrained and non-constrained groups are both negative, they are not statistically significant.

The estimation results of credit-constrained equation (8) are summarized in Table 3. According to this table, the probability of binding credit constraints is a positive function of debt; however, the ownership of a house significantly decreases the probability. These results imply that loan provisions are positively affected by the net amount of assets that can be used as collateral. Further, we also found that the respondents with higher education tended to have a lower probability of being credit-constrained; this confirmed the finding of Horioka and Kohara (1999).

Table 4 shows the estimation results of augmented Euler equation (7) under observable but endogenous credit constraints (8), achieved by maximizing the likelihood function in equation (10). In the Euler equation section, we find that the income coefficient for creditconstrained households is negative and statistically significant at 10%, while the coefficient for non-constrained households is not statistically different from zero. The result confirms our hypothesis that the source of violation of the standard LC-PIH is the binding credit constraint.

These results are consistent with the theory of consumption smoothing under endogenous credit constraints. With regard to the credit constraint equation, as observed in Table 4, the amount of outstanding debt and house ownership affects the probability of binding credit constraints positively and negatively, respectively. The dummy variables for higher education also significantly affect the probability.

#### 4.4 Estimation Results II: The Case of Unobserved Regimes

We present the second set of estimation results using the full sample from 1993 to 1999. This part comprises two subparts. First, we estimate an econometric model of augmented Euler equation (7) under unobservable credit-constraint indicators by maximizing the likelihood function in equation (11). Second, we estimate the augmented Euler equation by relaxing the assumption of the same coefficients across regimes. In this approach, we estimate equations (12), (13), and (14) jointly by maximizing the likelihood function in equation (15).<sup>8</sup>

In Table 5, we represent the estimation results of the augmented Euler equation under unobservable but endogenous credit constraints, achieved by maximizing the likelihood function in equation (11). In other words, we estimate the model of equations (12), (13), and (14) under constraints  $\beta_N = \beta_C$  and  $v_N = v_C = v$ . In the Euler equation section, we find that the income coefficients for credit-constrained and non-constrained households are negative and positive, respectively. The direction and statistical significance of the former coefficient is consistent with the theory of consumption smoothing under endogenous credit constraints. The estimation results of the credit constraint equation are summarized in the lower section of Table 5. While none of the individual coefficients are statistically significant, they are jointly significant at the 10% level.

<sup>8</sup> We also follow Zeldes' exogenous grouping approach (1989) and split the households based on the wealth-to-income ratio. A household is regarded as being credit-constrained if the calculated total non-housing wealth is less than two months' worth of the average income. The coefficients on the initial income for the constrained and non-constrained groups are negative as well as marginally significant. The level of statistical significance is slightly larger for the credit-constrained households. Table 6 summarizes the estimation results of equations (12), (13), and (14) jointly by maximizing the likelihood function in equation (16). The qualitative findings in Table 6 are similar to those in Table 5 even after relaxing the same coefficients on Euler equations, while the *t*-value of the income coefficient for the constrained group is a mere 1.34. Thus, the results only marginally support the theory. Interestingly, in the credit constraint equation, the coefficient on the year dummy variable for 1998 takes a large positive value and is statistically significant. This implies that the seriousness of the credit crunch at the household level had increased in 1998. Moreover, the estimated covariance of the error terms in (13) and (14) is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the endogeneity bias generated by credit constraints is not negligible.

#### 4.5 Probability of Binding Credit Constraints

In order to further compare credit accessibility across the years, we computed the probability of binding credit constraints  $\Phi(W_{ii}\hat{\beta}_{W})$  by using the estimated parameter vectors shown in Tables 4 and 6. Note that the joint Wald test results, where all the coefficients in the credit constraint equation are zero, support the validity of these estimated coefficients.<sup>9</sup>

Figures 2 and 3 represent the kernel density functions of the predicted creditconstrained probabilities using the switching regression results for 1993–1994 and 1993–1998, respectively. We employed a Gaussian kernel to estimate the density functions. The band width of the density function is selected such that the mean integrated square error is minimized. In both these figures, the distribution of credit-constrained households in 1993 is skewed toward the left in a similar manner, indicating that only a small portion of households face credit constraints. Note that the density function in Figure 2 is reliable because it is based

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The Wald test statistics are 78.39 with a p-value of 0.000 and 124.37 with a p-value of 0.000 for the results in Tables 4 and 6, respectively.

on direct credit constraint information. The similarity in the density functions for 1993 in Figures 2 and 3 suggests the validity of the results of the unobserved credit constraint model reported in Figure 3. In addition, as Figure 3 reveals, the density function moves slightly toward the right over time, indicating that the probability of binding credit constraints has increased. The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the equality of distributions reject the equality between the pairs of the three probability distributions of binding credit constraints in 1993, 1995, and 1998 at the 5% level of statistical significance. These findings may imply that the credit crunch generated negative effects on the households' consumption smoothing behavior especially at the end of the 1990s.

However, the median (average) probabilities of binding credit constraint in 1993, 1995, and 1998 are merely 8.88% (13.80%), 10.69% (14.88%), and 10.79% (13.83%), respectively. Hence, the negative welfare effects of credit crunch on household welfare may be negligible. Figure 4 further compares the three density functions by using the cumulative density functions of the predicted probabilities of binding credit constraints. By looking at Figure 4, we can perform an eye-ball test of the stochastic dominance; we ascertain that the second-order stochastic dominance holds. Initially, in 1993, for the relatively less credit-constrained group, the probability of binding credit constraints appears to have increased significantly. However, it is not necessarily obvious that the predicted probabilities in 1995 that, in turn, are dominated by the probabilities in 1998. In fact, based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, we cannot reject the same distribution if we take the 1% level of significance; this supports our result that credit crunch generated a rather minor effect on household welfare.

#### 4.6 Estimation Results III: Household Prudence

While these overall empirical results are in accordance with our theoretical framework, the level of statistical significance in Table 6 is not necessarily supportive of our theoretical framework. In order to improve the accuracy of our estimation, we employ an alternative estimation strategy based on equation (3). By doing so, we can also estimate the prudence parameter that summarizes the degree of precautionary saving.

We employ Type 5 Tobit model with unobserved regimes as before by including a new independent variable—squared consumption growth rate. However, an additional issue that we consider here is an endogeneity bias arising from a correlation between the error term of the Euler equation and the squared consumption growth rate on the right-hand side of equation (3) (Dynan, 1993). Specifically, we postulate a linear regression equation for the squared consumption growth rate. Assuming that the error terms of the squared consumption growth rate and the consumption growth rate equation follow a bivariate normal distribution, we can employ the two-stage method suggested by Smith and Blundell (1986) to control for the endogeneity bias (Lee and Sawada, 2005).

In the first step, we regress the squared consumption growth rate on a set of instrumental variables including marriage status, co-residence status, education variables, the number of household members, household ownership information, asset variables, and debt variables. While the adjusted R-squared is small (0.005), implying that the instruments explain only a small portion of the variation in consumption, we reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the instruments are jointly equal to zero in the first stage at the 1% level. These figures are comparable to those in previous studies, including Dynan (1993). In the second stage, we follow Smith and Blundell (1986) and include the residual from the first-stage regression to control for endogeneity bias. We then estimate augmented Euler equation (7) under unobservable credit constraint indicators given in equation (8) by maximizing the likelihood function in equation (11).

Table 7 shows the estimation results. Specification (1) represents the replication specification shown by Dynan (1993). It confirms the small prudence puzzle because the coefficient of squared consumption growth rate is not statistically different from zero. The

prudence estimates continue to be indistinguishable from zero (Specifications (2) and (3)) even when income is included. We also use the system of equations (7) and (8) by allowing different coefficients for the Euler equation parameters except the constant term.<sup>10</sup> If we split the sample endogenously, we find that income coefficients are negative and statistically significant for the credit-constrained households but insignificant for the non-constrained households (Specification (4)). In addition, the constrained households have stronger precautionary saving motives: They behave more prudently than the non-constrained ones. The degree of prudence for the constrained households ( $0.15 \times 2 = 0.3$ ) is larger than that in Dynan (ranging from 0.14 to 0.166). However, our estimates may still be smaller than the expected size of the prudence that ranges from 2 to 5 (Dynan, 1993; Lee and Sawada, 2007). The remaining gap may be related to the approximation bias, as argued by Ludvigson and Paxson (2001), and the concavity of the consumption function, as discussed by Carroll (2001) and Carroll and Kimball (2006).

#### 4.7 Supply- or Demand-Driven Crunch?

In order to identify whether the credit crunch was driven by supply or demand, we also estimate the prudence parameters for different phases. Specifically, we allow the prudence parameter to be different before and during the period from 1996 to 1998.<sup>11</sup> The result is reported in Specification (5) in Table 7. For the credit-constrained group, the prudence

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> We also tried to estimate the augmented Euler equation by jointly relaxing the assumption of the same coefficients across regimes, i.e., across equations (12), (13), and (14), by maximizing the likelihood function in equation (16) under the distributional assumption in equation (15). However, we failed to achieve convergence in this model.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> We attempted to differentiate the period from 1997 to 1998 but could not achieve convergence of the likelihood function.

parameter is slightly smaller for the latter period. Our estimates may be regarded as being consistent with those of Hori and Shimizutani (2006), who found that the prudence parameter had dropped in the period from 1997 to 1998.

If the prudence parameter increases, precautionary saving should increase and the optimal consumption level should decline; in such a case, precautionary saving is likely to act as a self-imposed credit constraint, as discussed in Deaton (1992). Thus, such a scenario is expected to present a demand-driven credit crunch. In contrast, our result shows that precautionary saving declines and optimal consumption level increases. This result implies that the credit crunch in 1997 was more likely to be supply-driven than demand-driven.

#### 5. Conclusions

In this study, we investigated the manner in which households in Japan were affected by the credit crunch. Several important empirical findings emerged. First, we found that a small but a non-zero portion of people face credit constraints. Accordingly, our results reject the standard consumption Euler equation, i.e., the necessary condition of the life cycle permanent income hypothesis. The maximum likelihood estimation results support our framework of the Euler equation with endogenous credit constraints. Finally, analyses of the full data for the period from 1993 to 1999 indicate that the credit crunch became particularly more prevalent at the household level after 1997. However, the overall negative impact of credit crunch may not be severe.

When market or non-market opportunities for risk sharing are limited, credit serves as an insurance substitute. In the event of negative transitory shocks to their income, households can obtain credit instead of receiving an insurance payment; this helps the households to smooth out such shocks. To a small group of marginally non-constrained households, the financial crunch in Japan appears to have disabled the role of credit as an important self-

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insurance device. However, our results suggest that the overall impact of the credit crunch on households was not significant. Our study suggests that unlike the Great Depression in the US in 1930 wherein consumer spending collapsed, thereby turning a minor recession into a serious depression (Olney, 1999), the credit crunch in Japan was unlikely to have magnified the negative macroeconomic shocks in 1997. In fact, a closer look at Figure 1 reveals that the number of people who filed for personal bankruptcies was less than a mere 0.01% of the total population in Japan until 1998.

While our results suggest that the credit crunch in Japan was supply-driven, the household-level impact might have been very small. Having stated this, we need to further investigate the robustness of our results based on household-level data in the context of Japanese economy in the 1990s. This line of research should provide imperative policy implications for any future credit crunch.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics								
Variable name	Code	Mean						
Voor		(Std. Dev.)						
Y ear		1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Number of boursely and members	Harris	1.00	4 1 4	4 17	4 17	4.22	1 25	4 29
Number of nousenoid members	Hnum	4.08	4.14	4.1/	4.1/	4.22	4.25	4.28
	<b>A</b> = -	(1.45)	(1.47)	(1.48)	(1.34)	(1.55)	(1.55)	(1.55)
Age of the respondent	Age	29.03	30.03	31.03	32.02	33.02	34.03	35.01
	D 14	(3.18)	(3.18)	(3.18)	(3.18)	(3.18)	(3.18)	(3.17)
Amount of outstanding debt (1993 price, in 10,000 Yen)	Debt	310.53	435.35	532.35	581.11	6/2.01	698.96	/56.33
	-	(759.91)	(897.08)	(1020.73)	(1060.37)	(1119.68)	(1126.10)	(1142.52)
Annual household expenditure (1993 price, in 10,000	Exp	173.69	181.68	189.97	193.76	195.50	213.42	217.24
Yen)		(89.24)	(92.79)	(96.26)	(91.16)	(91.59)	(110.43)	(114.59)
Expenditure growth rate between t and $t + 1$	Cgrowth	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.00	
		(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.57)	(0.53)	(0.48)	(0.52)	
Annual household income (1993 price, in 10,000 Yen)	Y	476.74	488.29	537.31	561.62	589.17	596.51	596.24
		(247.06)	(254.74)	(257.44)	(255.73)	(284.65)	(320.50)	(288.85)
Household assets (total amount of deposits plus total	Asset	284.09	320.19	359.32	393.55	384.72	402.28	421.53
amount of securities) (1993 price, in 10,000 yen)		(394.26)	(425.73)	(456.28)	(593.97)	(541.51)	(579.75)	(571.89)
Credit constraint dummy for 1993 based on Jappelli	Const	0.08						
(1990) (= 1,  if constrained; = 0,  otherwise)								
Household ownership dummy $(= 1, if own house; = 0,$	ownhouse	0.60	0.62	0.63	0.63	0.66	0.67	0.69
otherwise)								
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise)	Single	0.27	0.23	0.21	0.19	0.18	0.17	0.16
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with	Cores	0.25	0.22	0.20	0.16	0.15	0.14	0.13
other(s); = 0, otherwise)								
Education level dummy (= 1, if senior high school	edu2	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43
graduate; = 0, otherwise)								
Education level dummy (= 1, if vocational school	edu3	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
graduate: = 0, otherwise)								
Education level dummy (= 1, if junior college graduate; =	edu4	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
0 otherwise)								
Education level dummy (= 1 if university graduate = $0$	edu5	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
otherwise)	• due	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.112	0.11	0.12	0.12
Major city dummy (= 1 if major city: = 0 otherwise)	Bigcity	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
Other cities dummy $(=1, if other cities = 0 otherwise)$	City	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58
	City	0.57	0.09	0.07	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20
Sample size		807	807	807	807	807	807	791*

\* Between 1998 and 1999, 16 households dropped from the survey.

## Table 2. Exogenous Credit Constraints Test Estimation Results of the Euler Equation Dependent

		Coef.	Std. Err.
Single dummy (= 1, if	single	-0.063	(0.061)
single; = 0, otherwise)			
Co-residence dummy for	cores	0.066	(0.075)
single women (= 1, if living			
with other(s); = 0, otherwise)			
Age of the respondent	age	-0.238	(0.100)**
Age squared	age2	0.004	(0.002)**
First difference of the	dsize	-0.027	(0.026)+
household size			
Log income for credit-	ln_y_cc	-0.025	(0.017)++
constrained households			
Log income for non-	ln_y_nc	-0.021	(0.014)
constrained households			
Constant	_cons	3.705	(1.466)**
Sample size		807	

#### Variable: Growth Rate of Expenditure between 1993 and 1994

Note) Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. \*\* indicates significance at the 5%

level. + and ++ indicate that their p-values are 0.149 and 0.115, respectively.

Variable of Credit Constr	aints in 1993	•	
		Coef.	Std. Err.
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise)	single	0.324	(0.459)
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with other(s); = 0, otherwise)	cores	-0.292	(0.454)
Number of household members	hnum	0.038	(0.055)
Annual household income (1993 price, in log)	ln y	0.201	(0.251)
Log income squared	$\ln y2$	-0.030	(0.036)
Household assets (total amount of deposits plus total amount of securities) (1993 price, in log)	ln_ast	0.040	(0.108)
Log asset squared	ln_ast2	-0.025	(0.018)
Amount of outstanding debt (1993 price, in log)	ln_debt	0.215	(0.089)**
Amount of outstanding debt squared (1993 price, log value squared)	ln_debt2	-0.017	(0.012)
Household ownership dummy (= 1, if own house; = 0, otherwise)	ownhouse	-0.315	(0.179)*
Age of the respondent	age	-0.180	(0.424)
Age squared	age2	0.003	(0.007)
Education level dummy (= 1, if senior high school graduate; = 0, otherwise)	edu2	-0.381	(0.235)
Education level dummy (= 1, if vocational school graduate; = 0, otherwise)	edu3	-0.391	(0.277)
Education level dummy (= 1, if junior college graduate; = 0, otherwise)	edu4	-0.534	(0.284)**
Education level dummy (= 1 if university graduate; = 0 otherwise)	edu5	-1.040	(0.445)***
Major city dummy (= 1, if major city; = 0, otherwise)	bigcity	0.227	(0.235)
Other cities dummy (= 1, if other cities; = 0, otherwise)	city	-0.029	(0.205)
Constant	_cons	1.302	(6.090)
Sample size		807	

# Table 3. Estimation Results of the Probit of Credit Constraint Equation Dependent Variable: Discrete Variable of Credit Constraints in 1993

Note) Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. \*\*\* indicates significance at the 1% level; \*\*, at the 5% level; and \*, at the 10% level.

Control bits in the control bits in t
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise) Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with other(s); = 0, otherwise)single cores $-0.055$ $(0.059)$ Age of the respondent Age squaredage $-0.242$ $(0.100)^{**}$ Age squared First difference of the household size Log income for credit-constrained householdsage2 $0.004$ $(0.002)^{**}$ Log income for credit-constrained households Log income for non-constrained households Coresidence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with other(s); = 0, otherwise)single $0.319$ $(0.456)$ Coresidence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with other(s); = 0, otherwise)single $0.319$ $(0.456)$ Number of household members Annual household income (1993 price, in log)ln_y $0.187$ $(0.254)$ Log income squaredln_ast $0.046$ $(0.109)$ Household assets (total amount of deposits plus total amount of outstanding debt (1993 price, in log)ln_ast2 $-0.026$ $(0.018)$ Log asset squaredln_ast2 $-0.026$ $(0.018)$ Amount of outstanding debt (1993 price, in log)ln_debt $0.214$ $(0.089)^{**}$ Household ownership dummy (= 1, if own house; = 0, otherwise)ownhouse $-0.303$ $(0.180)^*$ Age of the respondentage $-0.165$ $(0.429)$ Age of the respondentage $0.007$ $0.007$
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with other(s); = 0, otherwise)cores0.055(0.082)Age of the respondent Age squaredage $-0.242$ (0.100)**Age of the respondent Age squaredage $-0.242$ (0.100)**First difference of the household size Log income for credit-constrained households Log income for non-constrained households Constant $\ln_y \ _vc$ $-0.024$ (0.018)*Mine dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise) Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with other(s); = 0, otherwise)single $0.319$ (0.456)Number of household members Annual household income (1993 price, in log) $\ln_y \ _y \ _y \ _z \ _z \ _z \ _z \ _z \ $
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Age squaredage2 $0.004$ $(0.002)^{**}$ First difference of the household sizedsize $-0.028$ $(0.026)$ Log income for credit-constrained households $\ln_y cc$ $-0.034$ $(0.018)^*$ Log income for non-constrained households $\ln_y nc$ $-0.021$ $(0.014)$ Constant_cons $3.765$ $(1.459)$ Credit constraint equationSingle dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise)Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with other(s); = 0, otherwise)single $0.319$ $(0.456)$ Number of household membershnum $0.030$ $(0.056)$ Annual household income (1993 price, in log) $\ln_y 2$ $-0.027$ $(0.036)$ Household assets (total amount of deposits plus total amount of securities) (1993 price, in log) $\ln_a ast$ $0.046$ $(0.109)$ Amount of outstanding debt (1993 price, in log) $\ln_a debt$ $-0.214$ $(0.089)^{**}$ Amount of outstanding debt squared (1993 price, log value squared) $\ln_a debt$ $-0.017$ $(0.012)$ Household ownership dummy (= 1, if own house; = 0, otherwise)ownhouse $-0.303$ $(0.180)^*$ Age of the respondent Age squaredage $-0.165$ $(0.429)$ Age squaredage2 $0.003$ $(0.007)$
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Amount of outstanding debt squared (1993 price, log value $\ln_debt2$ $-0.017$ $(0.012)$ squared)Household ownership dummy (= 1, if own house; = 0, otherwise)ownhouse $-0.303$ $(0.180)^*$ Age of the respondentage $-0.165$ $(0.429)$ Age squaredage2 $0.003$ $(0.007)$
SquaredSquaredownhouse; = 0,ownhouse $-0.303$ $(0.180)^*$ Household ownership dummy (= 1, if own house; = 0,ownhouse $-0.303$ $(0.180)^*$ otherwise)age $-0.165$ $(0.429)$ Age squaredage2 $0.003$ $(0.007)$
otherwise)age-0.165(0.429)Age squaredage20.003(0.007)
Age of the respondentage $-0.165$ $(0.429)$ Age squaredage2 $0.003$ $(0.007)$
Age squared age2 0.003 (0.007)
Education level dummy (= 1, if senior high school edu2 $-0.392$ (0.234)*
graduate; = 0, otherwise)
Education level dummy (= 1, if vocational school graduate; edu3 $-0.409$ (0.278)
= 0, otherwise) Education level dummy (= 1, if junior college graduate: = $edu4$ = $-0.552$ (0.289)*
0. otherwise)
Education level dummy (= 1, if university graduate; = 0, edu5 $-1.058$ (0.441)**
otherwise)
Major city dummy (= 1, if major city; = 0, otherwise) bigcity $0.232$ (0.236)
Other cities dummy (= 1, if other cities; = 0, otherwise) $city = 0.016 (0.213)$
Constant cons 1.147 (6.151)
Other parameters
$\sigma_v$ cons 0.497 (0.048)***
$\sigma_{v\varepsilon}$ _cons 0.030 (0.049)

## Table 4. Estimation Results of the Augmented Euler Equation Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Expenditure between 1993 and 1994

Note) Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. \*\*\* indicates significance at the 1% level; \*\*, at the 5% level; and \*, at the 10% level.

## Table 5. Estimation Results of the Augmented Euler Equation Dependent Variable: Annual Growth Rate of Expenditure between 1993 and 1999

		Coef.	Std. Err.
Euler equation			
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise)	single	0.049	(0.053)
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with	cores	0.060	(0.079)
other(s): = 0, otherwise)			( )
Age of the respondent	age	-0.052	(0, 060)
Age squared	age?	0.001	(0.000)
First difference of the household size	dsize	-0.001	(0.001)
Log income for credit-constrained households	ln y cc	_0.015	(0.012) (0.012)***
Log income for non-constrained households	ln_y_cc	0.007	(0.012) (0.012)***
Constant		0.054	(0.012)
Constant	_cons	0.934	(0.907)
Cradit constraint equation			
$\frac{\text{Creat constraint equation}}{\text{Single dymmy}(=1 \text{ if single} = 0 \text{ otherwise})}$	ainala	0 000	(0, 121)
Single dummy $(-1, 11 \text{ single}) = 0$ , otherwise)	single	0.098	(0.131)
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with	cores	0.185	(0.206)
other(s); = 0, otherwise)		0.000	(0.015)
Number of household members	hnum	-0.002	(0.015)
Annual household income (1993 price, in log)	ln_y	0.278	(0.368)
Log income squared	ln_y2	-0.022	(0.034)
Household assets (total amount of deposits plus total	ln_ast	-0.019	(0.046)
amount of securities) (1993 price, in log)			
Log asset squared	ln_ast2	0.002	(0.006)
Amount of outstanding debt (1993 price, in log)	ln_debt	-0.020	(0.026)
Amount of outstanding debt squared (1993 price, log value	ln debt2	0.002	(0.004)
squared)	—		~ /
Household ownership dummy (= 1, if own house; = 0,	ownhouse	0.018	(0.039)
otherwise)			( )
Age of the respondent	age	-0.036	(0.166)
Age squared	age2	0.001	(0.003)
Education level dummy (= 1 if senior high school	edu2	-0.016	(0.096)
graduate: = 0 otherwise)	••••	01010	(0.030)
Education level dummy (= 1 if vocational school	edu3	-0.056	(0.104)
araduate = 0 otherwise)	Cuus	0.020	(0.101)
Education level dummy (= 1 if junior college graduate: =	edu4	-0.029	(0.086)
0 otherwise)	Cuu+	0.027	(0.000)
Education level dummy $(= 1$ if university graduate: = 0	edu5	_0.086	(0, 104)
otherwise)	Cuus	0.000	(0.104)
Vear dummy for $1994 (= 1 \text{ if } 1994 := 0 \text{ otherwise})$	D94	_0.045	(0.058)
Vear dummy for $1005 (-1)$ if $1005 (-0)$ otherwise)	D05	0.045	(0.050)
Vear dummy for $1006 (-1)$ if $1006 (-0)$ otherwise)	D95	0.034	(0.054)
Vear dummy for $1007 (-1, if 1007; -0, otherwise)$	D90 D07	0.047	(0.009)
Year dynamy for $1009 (-1, 111997, -0, 00000000)$	D97	-0.099	(0.003)
Year dummy for 1998 $(-1, 111998)$ , $-0$ , otherwise)	D98	-0.040	(0.073)
Major city dummy (= 1, 11 major city; = 0 otherwise)	bigcity	-0.046	(0.053)
Other cities dummy (= 1, if other cities; = 0, otherwise)	city	-0.031	(0.051)
Constant	_cons	-0.255	(2.660)
<u>Other parameters</u>		0.500	
$\sigma_{v}$	_cons	0.706	(0.028)***
$\sigma_{v\epsilon}$	_cons	0.701	(0.028)*:*
		4842	

Sample size

Note) Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. \*\*\* indicates significance at the 1% level; \*\*, at the 5% level; and \*, at the 10% level.

## Table 6. Estimation Results of the Augmented Euler Equation Dependent Variable: Annual GrowthRate of Expenditure between 1993 and 1999

		Non-Constrained.		Constrained		
Euler equation		Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise)	single	0.019	(0.031)	0.162	(0.546)	
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living	cores	-0.005	(0.039)	0.511	(0.826)	
with other(s); $= 0$ , otherwise)			<b>`</b>			
Age of the respondent	age	-0.021	(0.031)	-0.267	(0.235)	
Age squared	age2	0.0003	(0.0004)	0.004	(0.004)	
First difference of the household size	dsize	-0.009	(0.015)	-0.014	(0.091)	
Log income	ln y	-0.006	(0.009)	-0.073	$(0.054)^+$	
Constant	cons	0.433	(0.492)	3.406	(3.412)	
Credit constraint equation	—				× /	
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise)	single	-0.840	(0.504)*			
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living	cores	1.709	(0.496)***			
with other(s); $= 0$ , otherwise)			<b>`</b>			
Number of household members	hnum	-0.033	(0.044)			
Annual household income (1993 price, in log)	ln y	-0.257	(0.133)**			
Log income squared	$\ln v2$	0.035	(0.018)**			
Household assets (total amount of deposits plus total	ln ast	0.010	(0.057)			
amount of securities) (1993 price, in log)	_		( )			
Log asset squared	ln ast2	-0.006	(0.008)			
Amount of outstanding debt (1993 price, in log)	ln_debt	0.043	(0.048)			
Amount of outstanding debt squared (1993 price, log	ln_debt2	-0.009	(0.008)			
value squared)			()			
Household ownership dummy (= 1, if own house; = 0,	ownhouse	0.023	(0.121)			
otherwise)			( )			
Age of the respondent	age	-0.225	(0.189)			
Age squared	age2	0.003	(0.003)			
Education level dummy (= 1 if senior high school	edu2	-0.070	(0.167)			
graduate; = 0, otherwise)			( )			
Education level dummy (= 1 if vocational school	edu3	-0.103	(0.186)			
graduate; = 0, otherwise)			<b>`</b>			
Education level dummy (= 1 if junior college graduate; =	edu4	-0.217	(0.203)			
0, otherwise)						
Education level dummy (=1 if university graduate; = $0$ ,	edu5	-0.236	(0.231)			
otherwise)			<b>`</b>			
Year dummy for $1994 (= 1, if 1994; = 0, otherwise)$	D94	0.220	(0.124)*			
Year dummy for 1995 (= 1, if 1995; = 0, otherwise)	D95	0.259	(0.140)*			
Year dummy for $1996 (= 1, if 1996; = 0, otherwise)$	D96	0.176	(0.140)			
Year dummy for 1997 (= 1, if 1997; = 0, otherwise)	D97	0.199	(0.174)			
Year dummy for 1998 (= 1, if 1998; = 0, otherwise)	D98	0.404	(0.165)**			
Major city dummy (= 1, if major city: = 0, otherwise)	bigcity	-0.351	(0.152)**			
Other cities dummy (= 1, if other cities; = 0, otherwise)	citv	-0.245	(0.125)*			
Constant	cons	3.473	(3.104)			
Other parameters						
$\sigma_{\rm N}^2$	cons	0.336	(0.020)***			
$\sigma_{\rm s}^2$	cons	1.376	(0.372)***			
$\sigma_{N_E}$		0.010	(0.026)			
σ <sub>Cε</sub>		0.921	(0.530)*			
Sample size			4842			

Note) Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. \*\*\* indicates significance at the 1% level; \*\*, at the 5% level; and \*, at the 10% level. + indicates the p-value of 0.179.

between 1993 and 1999									
Specification (		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)		
Method		IV	MLE	MLE	MLE		MLE		
Period		1993-	1993–	1993–	199	3–1998	1993-1998		
		1998	1994	1998					
Euler equation					Constrained	Unconstrained	Constrained	Unconstrained	
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = $0$ ,	single	0.045	0.007	0.053	-0.031	0.095	-0.034	0.106	
otherwise)	-	(0.053)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.051)*	(0.052)	(0.057)*	
Co-residence dummy for single women (=	cores	0.005	-0.169	0.045	0.142	-0.148	0.148	-0.155	
1, if living with other(s); = 0, otherwise)		(0.057)	(0.249)	(0.086)	(0.054)***	(0.057)***	(0.056)***	(0.061)**	
Age of the respondent	age	-0.041	-0.234	-0.052	-0.055	-0.060	-0.055	-0.061	
	-	(0.033)	(0.099)**	(0.063)	(0.030)*	(0.030)**	(0.032)*	(0.032)*	
Age squared	age2	0.001	0.004	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.0007	0.001	
	-	(0.001)	(0.002)**	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)**	(0.0005)	(0.0005)**	
First difference of the household size	dsize	-0.011	-0.030	-0.014	-0.022	0.023	-0.021	0.021	
		(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.012)*	(0.022)	(0.013)*	(0.027)	
Squared consumption growth rate	cgrowth2	0.025	0.327	0.029	0.152	-0.097	0.151	-0.092	
	-	(0.023)	(0.375)	(0.063)	(0.022)***	(0.017)***	(0.015)***	(0.017)***	
Squared consumption growth rate*dummy	cgrowth2	. ,					-0.022	0.0002	
for 1996–1998	9698						(0.008)***	(0.007)	
Residual from the squared consumption	res		-0.200	-0.019	0.004	-0.054	0.020	-0.058	
growth regression			(0.464)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.015)***	(0.019)	(0.015)***	
Log income for credit-constrained	ln y cc		-0.066	-0.067	-0.021		-0.020		
households			(0.021)***	(0.013)***	(0.009)**		(0.009)**		
Log income for non-constrained households	ln y nc		-0.013	0.035	. ,	-0.006		-0.007	
-			(0.011)	(0.013)***		(0.013)		(0.013)	
Constant	cons	0.702	3.655		1	.012	1	.013	
	_	(0.522)	(1.453)**		(0.475)**		(0.5	500)**	
Credit constraint equation included?		NO	YES	YES	X	YES	Y	ZES	
Over-identification restriction tests based		0.667							
on Sargan pseudo-F tests									
Sample size		4842	807	4842	4	842	4	842	
Note) Standard errors are indicated in parentheses $***$ indicates significance at the 1% level: $**$ at the 5% level: and $*$ at the 10% level $+$ indicates									

 Table 7. Estimation Results of the Augmented Euler Equation with the Prudence Term Dependent Variable: Annual Growth Rate of Expenditure

 between 1993 and 1999

Note) Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. \*\*\* indicates significance at the 1% level; \*\*, at the 5% level; and \*, at the 10% level. + indicates the p-value of 0.179.





Number of Individual Bankruptcies

Data source) The Supreme Court of Japan

### Figure 2

Kernel Density Function of Probability of Binding Credit Constraints in 1993



### Figure 3

### Kernel Density Function of Probability of Binding Credit Constraints









Cumulative Density Function of Probability to be Credit-Constrained