

CIRJE-F-739

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Yi-Ling Cheng

National Taiwan University

Shin-Kun Peng

Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University

Takatoshi Tabuchi

University of Tokyo

April 2010

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Multiproduct Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation

Yi-Ling Cheng* Shin-Kun Peng† Takatoshi Tabuchi‡

25 April 2010

Abstract: The paper investigates a two-stage competition in a vertical differentiated industry, where each firm produces an arbitrary number of similar qualities and sells them to heterogeneous consumers. We show that, when unit costs of quality are increasing and quadratic, each firm has an incentive to provide an interval of qualities. The finding is in sharp contrast to the single-quality outcome when the market coverage is exogenously determined. We also show that allowing for an interval of qualities intensifies competition, lowers the profits of each firm and raises the consumer surplus and the social welfare in comparison to the single-quality duopoly. (*JEL Classification:* D21, D43, L11, L13).

Keywords: multiproduct firms, market segmentation, quality competition, vertical product differentiation.

*National Taiwan University. Department of Economics, National Taiwan University. 21 Hsu-Chow Road, Taipei, 100 Taiwan. *E-mail:* d94323011@ntu.edu.tw

†Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University. 128 Academia Road, Section 2, Nankang, Taipei, 115 Taiwan. *E-mail:* speng@econ.sinica.edu.tw

‡Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, Hongo-7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan. *E-mail:* ttabuchi@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp

I. Introduction

The literature on vertical product differentiation often makes the assumption that any one firm can produce only one product. Although this is analytically convenient, in reality, firms normally produce and sell multiple differentiated products. However, a causal survey of the evidence suggests that, in some industries, product qualities are sometimes entangled and keen competition takes place between firms that deal in similar qualities. In other industries, product qualities are segmented and competition is relaxed. In this paper, we focus on the segmented market structure in a duopoly where there are high-quality and low-quality multiproduct firms.

For example, in the microprocessor market, Intel produces various models of the Core 2 Duo, including the E8500, E8400, E8200, and E6850, while AMD produces the Athlon 64 X2 product line, which includes models such as the 7850, 7750, and 7550. Because the quality of Intel's line is higher, the market is vertically segmented. Similarly, in the automobile industry, BMW and Mercedes-Benz both sell three classes of sedans. The sedans produced by BMW and Mercedes-Benz are of a higher quality than those offered by Ford.

Although, in reality, vertically differentiated product markets are usually multiproduct oligopolies, this reality has not been studied well in related literature; this is probably because this model is far more difficult to analyze.¹ As Chambers, Kouvelis, and Semple [2006] noted, it is important to pay attention to the assumed unit costs of quality improvement and market coverage when analyzing vertically differentiated product competition; this is because these play a crucial role in the market outcome.

The literature on two-stage competition in a vertical differentiated industry often makes the assumption that unit costs of quality improvement are zero, linear, or quadratic despite the fact that there is no apparent reason for making this assumption. Our model identifies the factors that influence whether firms will produce single or

¹Notable exceptions are Katz [1984] and Gilbert and Matutes [1993] and Champsaur and Rochet [1989, 1990].

multiple products; we do this by looking into the second derivative of the cost function. We reveal that when the unit cost is concave, each firm produces a single quality. Since our purpose is to investigate multiproduct firms, we assume strictly convex cost functions. For analytical tractability, we specify that unit costs of quality improvement are quadratic, just as Champsaur and Rochet [1989] and Motta [1993] do, among others. While Champsaur and Rochet [1990, Proposition 2] found that a two-stage competition in a vertical differentiated industry produces a single product duopoly, we find that a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) exists, such that each firm produces an interval of products.

In terms of market coverage, all consumers are to be served if consumers' willingness to pay for quality is not heterogeneous. If consumer taste is sufficiently heterogeneous, then there is no incentive for firms to serve those consumers who are less willing to pay for quality and thus cover the entire market. Therefore, market coverage depends on the distribution of consumers' willingness to pay. Nevertheless, previous studies, including Champsaur and Rochet [1989, 1990], have often assumed that firms must cover the entire market and serve all consumers.

It is known that a monopolist does not cover the whole market even if costs of quality improvement are zero (Mussa and Rosen [1978]; Gabszewicz, Shaked, Sutton and Thisse [1986]). He offers an interval of qualities but only for consumers with high willingness-to-pay. Extending their models to duopoly, Champsaur and Rochet [1989, 1990] and Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed [2006] show that each firm produces a single quality rather than a range of qualities under the similar set-up: the quasilinear utility, the uniform distribution of consumer taste, and the quadratic cost of quality improvement. We will show that the single-product outcome is attributed to full market coverage whereas the multiproduct outcome is ascribed to partial market coverage. This suggests that market coverage plays an important role for emergence of multiproduct firms. If the market is not assumed to be fully covered, firms would produce more distinct qualities to segment the market. Then, more consumers would make a

purchase and thus the size of market would be enlarged.

The primary purpose of this paper is to examine market segmentation by multi-product duopolists in a vertically differentiated market and to characterize SPNE and the level of social welfare on the basis of the common assumptions made by Champsaur and Rochet [1989, 1990]. While we use Champsaur and Rochet's work and conclusions as a starting point, our model differs from them in that the firms in our market do not have to cover the entire market. We show that an uncovered market equilibrium is very different from a covered one.

In this paper, we examine a two-stage competition in a vertically differentiated industry, where each firm provides a number of products with similar qualities. Each duopolist simultaneously chooses the number of products and qualities of its products in the first stage, and then competes in terms of price in the second stage. The market coverage is endogenously determined in the duopolistic competition.

Previewing our other results, we show that the low-quality firm produces a wider range of qualities, serves more consumers, and earns lower profits than the high-quality firm. This is because the unit profit obtained by the high-quality product is much higher. We also show that the multiproduct duopolists face a so-called prisoner's dilemma. Their profits go down by offering too many qualities, although the consumer surplus and the social welfare are higher because of the keen competition.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the model and examines the second-stage price equilibrium. Section III investigates the first-stage quality interval equilibrium and characterizes the SPNE under the quadratic cost of quality improvement. We show that each firm produces an interval of qualities rather than a single quality when consumer preference is sufficiently heterogeneous. Section IV considers the welfare implications by computing the consumer surplus and the social welfare. Section V outlines the conclusions that can be made on the back of this model.

II. The Model

There are two firms, A and B , which have identical production technology in terms of their quality improvement. Each firm produces a number of products with similar qualities. The products of firm A are indexed as $1, 2, \dots, n_a$, and their qualities are indexed as q_1, q_2, \dots, q_{n_a} ; the products of firm B are indexed as $n_a + 1, n_a + 2, \dots, n_a + n_b$, and their qualities are indexed as $q_{n_a+1}, q_{n_a+2}, \dots, q_{n_a+n_b}$, where $q_i > q_{i+1}$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n_a + n_b - 1$ so that both firms offer a connected range of qualities.² In addition, the associated prices of these quality-differentiated goods are denoted by $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_{n_a+n_b}$, respectively.

There is a continuum of consumers, each of whom has a different taste for quality. Their willingness to pay for quality is distributed uniformly over the interval $[\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ and the density is normalized to 1. Each consumer purchases one unit of the product either from firm A or B , or does not purchase at all. Following Tirole [1988], we assume the utility function of consumer θ is given by

$$U(\theta_i, q_i) = \begin{cases} \theta q_i - p_i & \text{if she purchases quality } q_i \text{ at price } p_i \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

This utility implies that all consumers unanimously prefer a higher quality at a given price and that consumers with higher θ will pay more for a higher quality.

Consumer demand is determined as follows: Marginal consumers, indexed by θ_i , are indifferent as to whether they will purchase quality q_i at price p_i or quality q_{i+1} at price p_{i+1} . Solving $U(\theta_i, q_i) = U(\theta_i, q_{i+1})$ yields

$$(1) \quad \theta_i = \begin{cases} \frac{p_i - p_{i+1}}{q_i - q_{i+1}} & \text{for } i = 1, \dots, n_a + n_b - 1 \\ \max \left\{ \frac{p_{n_a+n_b}}{q_{n_a+n_b}}, \underline{\theta} \right\} & \text{for } i = n_a + n_b \end{cases}$$

Thus, any consumer with an index greater than θ_i will prefer q_i to q_{i+1} for all $i = 1, \dots, n_a + n_b - 1$, and any consumer with an index of less than $p_{n_a+n_b}/q_{n_a+n_b}$ will prefer

²We exclude entangled configurations. For example, if firm A produces two qualities— q_1 and q_3 —and firm B produces q_2 and q_4 , then the first-order conditions in the first-stage quality subgame are given by four polynomials of degree 11 with four variables q_1, q_2, q_3 , and q_4 , which are far from analytically tractable.

not to buy at all than to buy $q_{n_a+n_b}$. Previous studies (Champsaur and Rochet [1989, 1990]; Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed [2006]) tend to assume that $\theta_{n_a+n_b} = \underline{\theta}$ rather than the second line of (1). $\theta_{n_a+n_b} = \underline{\theta}$ means that the whole market would be covered. However, there is no reason for firm B to serve consumers $\underline{\theta}$ whose willingness to pay for unit quality is the lowest; this is because firms can select the range of qualities in the free world. We therefore assume that the market coverage is endogenously determined by the market fundamentals, which are given by $\underline{\theta}$ and $\bar{\theta}$.

The demand x_i for q_i is determined by (1) as follows:

$$x_i = \begin{cases} \bar{\theta} - \theta_1 & \text{for } i = 1 \\ \theta_{i-1} - \theta_i & \text{for } i = 2, \dots, n_a + n_b \end{cases}$$

Following Tirole [1988], we assume that the production activities are fully additive; this means that the unit cost of quality improvement is independent of its quantities and dependent on quality. Furthermore, as Moorthy [1988], Champsaur and Rochet [1989], and Champers, Chambers, Kouvelis, and Semple [2006] do, we assume that the cost of quality is associated with the variable cost rather than fixed production cost. The profits of firm A and B are then given by

$$(2) \quad \pi_a = \sum_{i=1}^{n_a} [p_i - c(q_i)]x_i ; \quad \pi_b = \sum_{i=n_a+1}^{n_a+n_b} [p_i - c(q_i)]x_i$$

where $c(q_i)$ is the unit cost of quality improvement.³

Assumption 1 *The unit cost of quality improvement is strictly convex.*

Assumption 1 indicates that the marginal quality improvements become increasingly costly. This is also assumed by Mussa and Rosen [1978] and Champsaur and Rochet [1989, 1990] in their models, among others, whereas Choi and Shin [1992] and Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed [2006] assume that quality improvement incurs linear

³Unlike Motta [1993], we disregard the fixed cost of quality improvement because firms are very unlikely to offer multiple qualities in the presence of fixed costs.

costs. Because the utility is of the form $u = \theta q_i$, the willingness to pay for a unit quality is constant. When the unit costs of quality improvement are concave, then the higher the quality is, the lower the marginal cost of improving a unit quality will be. Therefore, firms are incentivized to sell qualities at a price that is as high as possible; this implies that they have no reason to offer goods of a lower quality and segment the market, as shown in Appendix 1. Because there are very few single product firms in the real world, we should not assume the concave cost of quality improvement. On the contrary, if the unit costs of quality improvement are convex, then the marginal cost of a lower quality will be lower while the willingness to pay for a quality will remain constant. This may enable firms to offer multiple products and segment the market.

Assumption 2 *The lower bound $\underline{\theta}$ of the consumer distribution is sufficiently small.*

The lower bound $\underline{\theta}$ is so small that it is less than the equilibrium value of $p_{n_a+n_b}/q_{n_a+n_b}$, which implies that the market is never fully covered. The uncovered market is also assumed by Choi and Shin [1992] and Motta [1993], among others. If this assumption is found not to be the case, then the whole market may be covered. However, there is another possible situation between the two, which is called the “corner solution”; in this situation, the price of the lowest quality is set such that the consumer with the lowest $\theta = \underline{\theta}$ will be indifferent as to whether or not they will buy the lowest quality. When $\underline{\theta}$ is not sufficiently small, there will be three possible strategies that firm B , who produces the lowest quality $q_{n_a+n_b}$ in the second line of (1), can adopt. These strategies are as follows: (i) to uncover the market $\theta_{n_a+n_b} = p_{n_a+n_b}/q_{n_a+n_b}$ for large $\bar{\theta}/\underline{\theta}$, (ii) to use the “corner solution” $\theta_{n_a+n_b} = \underline{\theta} = p_{n_a+n_b}/q_{n_a+n_b}$ for intermediate $\bar{\theta}/\underline{\theta}$, and (iii) to cover the market $\theta_{n_a+n_b} = \underline{\theta}$ for small $\bar{\theta}/\underline{\theta}$.⁴

⁴Such a “corner solution” arises in an oligopoly, but not in a monopoly. In fact, Gabszewicz, Shaked, Sutton and Thisse [1986] show that a multiproduct monopolist will segment the market by offering the maximum number of qualities permitted when $\bar{\theta}/\underline{\theta}$ is below a threshold, and that he will only offer the top quality product when $\bar{\theta}/\underline{\theta}$ is above the threshold. The former corresponds to (i) uncovering the market and the latter (iii) covering the market.

Even if we do not allow firms to offer multiple products in the model, any analysis of SPNE will be very complicated (Wauthy [1996]; Liao [2008]). All three cases have to be checked to ensure that each firm has no incentive to deviate to an arbitrary number of qualities; this makes the process more complicated. This is why we assume Assumption 2.

In our model, the two firms play a two-stage game under these two assumptions. In the first stage, they simultaneously choose the number of products and the qualities of their products. In the second stage, they simultaneously select the prices of their products, having observed the number of products and their qualities. Using backward induction, we first solve the first-order conditions for prices in the second stage. From this, the following lemma is obtained; the proof can be found in Appendix 2.

Lemma 1 *For any given qualities with an arbitrary number, there exists a unique price equilibrium given by*

$$(3) \quad p_i^* = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} \left[c(q_i) + q_i \bar{\theta} + \frac{q_b c(q_a) + 2q_a c(q_b) - 3q_a q_b \bar{\theta}}{4q_a - q_b} \right] & \text{for } i = 1, 2, \dots, n_a - 1 \\ \frac{2q_a c(q_a) + q_a c(q_b) + 2q_a (q_a - q_b) \bar{\theta}}{4q_a - q_b} \equiv p_a^* & \text{for } i = n_a \\ \frac{q_b c(q_a) + 2q_b c(q_b) + q_b (q_a - q_b) \bar{\theta}}{4q_a - q_b} \equiv p_b^* & \text{for } i = n_a + 1 \\ \frac{1}{2} \left\{ c(q_i) + \frac{q_i [2c(q_a) + c(q_b) + 2(q_a - q_b) \bar{\theta}]}{4q_a - q_b} \right\} & \text{for } i = n_a + 2, \dots, n_a + n_b \end{cases}$$

where brands $q_a \equiv q_{n_a}$ and $q_b \equiv q_{n_a+1}$ are in direct competition.

When n_a and n_b reach infinity, we have

$$(4) \quad \lim_{n_a, n_b \rightarrow \infty} \theta_i = \lim_{n_a, n_b \rightarrow \infty} \frac{dp_i}{dq_i} = \frac{1}{2} [c'(q_i) + \bar{\theta}]$$

for all $i \neq n_a, n_a + 1$ from (1) and (3). This corresponds to equation (17) in Mussa and Rosen [1978], where a monopolist perfectly discriminates consumers by equalizing the marginal revenue and cost of increments of quality improvement.

Since Assumption 2 presumes an uncovered market, the second-stage price subgame is uniquely determined for any qualities with an arbitrary number by Lemma 1. Therefore, we can safely focus on the first-stage quality competition.

III. Quadratic Cost of Quality Improvement

From Assumption 1, we consider a strictly convex unit cost of quality improvement. More specifically, we set a quadratic form $c(q_i) = q_i^2/2$ for mathematical tractability as Champsaur and Rochet [1989, 1990], Motta [1993], among others.⁵

Champsaur and Rochet [1990] assume an exogenously covered market, whereas our model assumes an endogenously uncovered market, on the basis of Assumption 2. As a result, Champsaur and Rochet [1990, Proposition 2] show that each firm offers a single quality, whereas we show below that each firm offers an interval of qualities in SPNE.

Substituting the second-stage equilibrium prices (3) into the profits (2), we have the equilibrium profits, π_a^* and π_b^* , as functions of $q_1, q_2, \dots, q_{n_a+n_b}$. The first-order conditions to be solved simultaneously are

$$(5) \quad \frac{\partial \pi_a^*}{\partial q_1} = 0 \Rightarrow 3q_1 - q_2 - 2\bar{\theta} = 0$$

$$(6) \quad \frac{\partial \pi_a^*}{\partial q_i} = 0 \Rightarrow q_{i-1} - 2q_i + q_{i+1} = 0 \text{ for } i = 2, \dots, n_a - 1$$

$$(7) \quad \frac{\partial \pi_a^*}{\partial q_a} = 0$$

$$(8) \quad \frac{\partial \pi_b^*}{\partial q_b} = 0$$

$$(9) \quad \frac{\partial \pi_b^*}{\partial q_i} = 0 \Rightarrow q_{i-1} - 2q_i + q_{i+1} = 0 \text{ for } i = n_a + 2, \dots, n_a + n_b - 1$$

$$(10) \quad \frac{\partial \pi_b^*}{\partial q_{n_a+n_b}} = 0 \Rightarrow q_{n_a+n_b-1} - 2q_{n_a+n_b} = 0$$

$$(11) \quad \Delta \pi_a^* \equiv \pi_a^*(n_a + 1, n_b, \mathbf{q}(n_a + 1), \mathbf{q}(n_b)) - \pi_a^*(n_a, n_b, \mathbf{q}(n_a), \mathbf{q}(n_b)) = 0$$

$$(12) \quad \Delta \pi_b^* \equiv \pi_b^*(n_a, n_b + 1, \mathbf{q}(n_a), \mathbf{q}(n_b + 1)) - \pi_b^*(n_a, n_b, \mathbf{q}(n_a), \mathbf{q}(n_b)) = 0$$

where $\mathbf{q}(n_a) \equiv (q_1(n_a), \dots, q_{n_a-1}(n_a), q_a(n_a))$ is the optimal quality line produced by firm A given n_a , n_b and $q_b(n_b)$ and $\mathbf{q}(n_b) \equiv (q_b(n_b), q_{n_a+2}(n_b), \dots, q_{n_a+n_b}(n_b))$ is the optimal quality line by firm B given n_a , n_b and $q_a(n_a)$. We compute the equilibrium values in three steps.

⁵Under different convex costs of quality improvement, most of the results do not differ much qualitatively, according to our numerical analysis.

Step 1. Solving (5), (6), (9) and (10) leads to

$$(13) \quad q_i^* = \begin{cases} \frac{(2i-1)q_a+2(n_a-i)\bar{\theta}}{2n_a-1} & \text{for } i = 1, \dots, n_a - 1 \\ \frac{n_a+n_b+1-i}{n_b}q_b & \text{for } i = n_a + 2, \dots, n_a + n_b \end{cases}$$

From (13), we can readily show that $q_{i-1}^* - q_i^*$ is constant for all qualities except for fighting brands q_a^* and q_b^* . Note that a multiproduct monopolist also sets $q_{i-1}^* - q_i^*$ as a constant in his optimal quality decision (Mussa and Rosen [1978]).⁶ Therefore, monopoly and duopoly give the same results for all brands except for fighting brands q_a^* and q_b^* ; this situation, of course, does not exist in a monopoly.

Step 2. Plugging (13) into the profits, we obtain

$$(14) \quad \begin{aligned} \pi_a^*(n_a + 1, n_b, q_a(n_a), q_b(n_b)) - \pi_a^*(n_a, n_b, q_a(n_a), q_b(n_b)) &= \frac{2n_a(\bar{\theta} - q_a(n_a))^3}{3(4n_a - 1)^3} > 0 \\ \pi_b^*(n_a, n_b + 1, q_a(n_a), q_b(n_b)) - \pi_b^*(n_a, n_b, q_a(n_a), q_b(n_b)) &= \frac{(2n_b + 1)q_b(n_b)^3}{48n_b^2(n_b + 1)^2} > 0 \end{aligned}$$

The positive increments of profits in (14) indicate that each firm has an incentive to increase the number of qualities holding the quality of its fighting brand unchanged. Furthermore, $q_a(n_a + 1)$ is the optimal quality of A 's fighting brand given $n_a + 1$, n_b and $q_b(n_b)$, and $q_b(n_b + 1)$ is the optimal quality of B 's fighting brand given n_a , $n_b + 1$ and $q_a(n_a)$ by definition. Therefore, we necessarily have

$$(15) \quad \begin{aligned} \pi_a^*(n_a + 1, n_b, q_a(n_a + 1), q_b(n_b)) &\geq \pi_a^*(n_a + 1, n_b, q_a(n_a), q_b(n_b)) \\ \pi_b^*(n_a, n_b + 1, q_a(n_a), q_b(n_b + 1)) &\geq \pi_b^*(n_a, n_b + 1, q_a(n_a), q_b(n_b)) \end{aligned}$$

Putting (14) and (15) together, we get $\Delta\pi_a^* > 0$ and $\Delta\pi_b^* > 0$, which implies that $n_a^*, n_b^* \rightarrow \infty$. Stated differently, each firm produces an interval of qualities rather than a finite number of products. Therefore, *each firm chooses to offer an interval of qualities* although they can reduce the number of similar qualities arbitrarily.

Step 3. Substituting (13) into (7) and (8), and taking the limit of $n_a, n_b \rightarrow \infty$, we can reduce to

$$f_A \equiv 2q_a(q_a - q_b)(8q_a^3 - 6q_a^2q_b + 6q_aq_b^2 + q_b^3) - 18q_aq_b^3\bar{\theta} + (20q_a + q_b)q_b^3\bar{\theta}^2 = 0$$

⁶The constant property does not hold both in a monopoly and in a duopoly if consumers' taste for quality is not uniformly distributed.

and

$$\begin{aligned}
f_B &\equiv (16q_a^5 - 92q_a^4q_b + 208q_a^3q_b^2 - 124q_a^2q_b^3 + 20q_aq_b^4 - q_b^5) \\
&\quad + 16q_a(q_a - q_b)(4q_a^2 - 11q_aq_b + q_b^2)\bar{\theta} + 16q_a^2(4q_a - 7q_b)\bar{\theta}^2 \\
&= 0
\end{aligned}$$

In order to solve the simultaneous equations $f_A = f_B = 0$, by using the Buchberger's algorithm (Cox, Little and O'Shea [1997]) we compute the Gröbner bases, one of which is the 12th-order polynomial of q_b . We can then readily verified that there exists a unique solution of q_b in the interval of $(0, \bar{\theta})$. Plugging it into $f_A = 0$ gives us

$$q_a^* = 0.779\bar{\theta} ; \quad q_b^* = 0.418\bar{\theta}$$

The second-order conditions for profit maximization are shown to be satisfied. Furthermore, taking the limit of (13), we get

$$\lim_{n_a, n_b \rightarrow \infty} q_1^* = \bar{\theta} ; \quad \lim_{n_a, n_b \rightarrow \infty} q_{n_a+n_b}^* = 0$$

Accordingly, we have obtained a unique candidate for SPNE. The fact that it is a unique SPNE is clearly demonstrated in the two-stage game as follows; the proof is contained in Appendix 3.

Proposition 1 *There exists a unique SPNE where firms A and B offer the interval of qualities*

$$[q_a^*, q_1^*] = [0.779\bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta}] \quad \text{and} \quad [q_{n_a+n_b}^*, q_b^*] = [0, 0.418\bar{\theta}] .$$

respectively.

Proposition 1 presents the main result of our model: there is a multi-quality equilibrium where each duopolist produces an interval of qualities. This result contrasts sharply with the single-quality outcome outlined in Champsaur and Rochet [1989, Proposition 3; 1990, Proposition 2], where the market is assumed to be covered exogenously. In this case, all consumers have a sufficiently low reservation utility ($\underline{\theta} \gg 0$);

this implies that all consumers will make a purchase, that is, the demand is not elastic. Given the fixed market size, the negative effect of cannibalization dominates the positive effect of segmentation. This functions in much the same way as Hotelling's [1929] spatial competition; hence, each firm has no incentive to provide multiple products.

On the contrary, when the market is not covered, the demand is more elastic because consumers with high reservation utility do not tend to purchase any products. In this case, firms are likely to segment and enlarge the market by offering multiple products. Thus, in the uncovered market, the positive effect of segmentation outweighs the negative effect of cannibalization.

According to Proposition 1, no firms produce intermediate qualities between $0.418\bar{\theta}$ and $0.779\bar{\theta}$, despite the fact that this interval is at the center of quality distribution. It is therefore in the interest of each firm to leave a gap between two product lines in order to relax the price competition at an SPNE. This is clearly an example of Champsaur and Rochet's [1989] Proposition 5.

From Proposition 1 and the equilibrium prices (3), the intervals of served consumers are computed as follows: Firm A serves consumers in the range of

$$\left[\frac{p_a^*(q^*) - p_b^*(q^*)}{q_a^* - q_b^*}, \bar{\theta} \right] = [0.708\bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$$

and firm B serves consumers in the range of

$$\left[\frac{p_{n_b+n_a}^*}{q_{n_b+n_a}^*}, \frac{p_a^*(q^*) - p_b^*(q^*)}{q_a^* - q_b^*} \right] = [0.262\bar{\theta}, 0.708\bar{\theta}]$$

where all the prices and qualities are evaluated at $n_a, n_b \rightarrow \infty$. It should be noted that the market is uncovered, since consumers in the range of $[0, 0.262\bar{\theta}]$ are not served. By combining Proposition 1 with the above results, we can say that *the low-quality firm provides a wider quality range and serves more consumers than the high-quality firm*. Because the market is uncovered, the low-quality firm wants to attract consumers who originally did not make a purchase. This is done by expanding the product line to lower qualities and selling them for lower prices. As a result, the low-quality firm offers a wider quality interval and serves more customers.

In the market of home video game consoles, Nintendo introduced Wii and Sony introduced PlayStation 3 in similar period.⁷ As compared to Wii, PlayStation has robust multimedia capabilities and a high-definition optical disc format, Blu-ray Disc, which target at professional players. PlayStation is thus sold at higher prices than Wii, and its market share is smaller than Wii (the market shares of PlayStation and Wii in 2009 are 26% and 50%, respectively).

The uncovered range $[0, 0.262\bar{\theta}]$ here is narrower than that in a single-product duopoly ($[0, 0.376\bar{\theta}]$ in Motta [1993]) or a monopoly ($[0, 0.5\bar{\theta}]$ in Mussa and Rosen [1978]). This is because the interval competition here is keener than in the others.

When n_a and n_b reach infinity, the profits of the qualities are calculated as

$$\begin{aligned}
 (16) \quad & \sum_{i=1}^{n_a-1} [p_i^*(q^*) - c(q_i^*)] (\theta_{i-1}^* - \theta_i^*) = 0.0125\bar{\theta}^2 \\
 & [p_a^* - c(q_a^*)] (\theta_{n_a-1}^* - \theta_{n_a}^*) = 0.0192\bar{\theta}^2 \\
 & [p_b^* - c(q_b^*)] (\theta_{n_a}^* - \theta_{n_a+1}^*) = 0.0156\bar{\theta}^2 \\
 & \sum_{i=n_a+2}^{n_a+n_b} [p_i^*(q^*) - c(q_i^*)] (\theta_{i-1}^* - \theta_i^*) = 0.0084\bar{\theta}^2
 \end{aligned}$$

where $\theta_0^* \equiv \bar{\theta}$. The second and third lines in (16) are the profits of fighting brands, q_a^* and q_b^* , respectively. The fighting brands imperfectly price discriminate consumers by “bunching” consumers with different tastes for the same quality. On the other hand, the first and last lines in (16) are the profits by offering intervals of qualities (q_a^*, q_1^*) and $(q_{n_a+n_b}^*, q_b^*)$, respectively.⁸ Because they are independent of the strategy of the other firm, each firm acts as a local monopolist and extracts consumers’ surplus by offering a range of qualities with perfect price discrimination. This is done by equalizing the marginal revenue and cost of increments of quality improvement given by (4).

⁷Note that although Nintendo and Sony provide one model of game consoles rather than multiple models in each period, their retailers often bundle the console with its accessories in several combinations.

⁸The second and third lines in (16) are called pure differentiation profits and the first and last lines in (16) are called pure segmentation profits by Champsaur and Rochet [1989].

In sum, the equilibrium profit of each firm is computed by

$$\lim_{n_a, n_b \rightarrow \infty} (\pi_a^*, \pi_b^*) = (0.0317\bar{\theta}^3, 0.0240\bar{\theta}^3)$$

The higher-quality firm A is more profitable than the lower-quality firm B although the higher-quality firm provides a narrower quality range and serves less consumers. Intuitively, this is because a higher-quality product is purchased by consumers with higher willingness to pay for a unit quality (i.e., higher θ).

In the case of single-product duopoly in an uncovered market, the profits can be given by $(\pi_a^*, \pi_b^*) = (0.0328\bar{\theta}^3, 0.0243\bar{\theta}^3)$. Hence, we establish the following:

Proposition 2 *The profit of each firm in a multiproduct duopoly is lower than that in a single-product duopoly.*

As the above breakdown shows, when firms are allowed to produce as many qualities as they like, they tend to offer an interval of qualities rather than a finite number of products. However, Proposition 2 shows that the profit of each firm gets lower. This exemplifies the prisoner's dilemma.

Note however that Proposition 2 does not hold for monopoly. When a monopolist is allowed to produce an arbitrary number of qualities, he offers a quality range of $q^* \in [0, \bar{\theta}]$ and serves consumers only in the range of $\theta^* \in [0.5\bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ (Mussa and Rosen, [1978]). On the other hand, if $\underline{\theta}$ is not small and exceeds $0.5\bar{\theta}$, then the optimal policy for the monopolist is to provide a single quality $q_1^* = 0.667\bar{\theta}$, served consumers are $\theta^* \in [0.667\bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$. The former profit of multiproduct monopoly is calculated as $0.0833\bar{\theta}^3$, which is higher than that of single-product monopoly given by $0.0741\bar{\theta}^3$. This is because in the absence of competition the monopolist does not fall into the prisoner's dilemma, but exploits the consumer surplus by offering a range of qualities.

Although the high-quality firm A produces a narrower quality range and serves fewer consumers, the profit of each quality of firm A is always higher than that of firm B according to (16). Because firm A earns the higher aggregate profit, the negative effect

of the narrower range is overwhelmed by the positive effect of the higher willingness to pay for higher qualities. The same results are obtained in the case of the single-product duopoly.

IV. Social Welfare

In this section, we look into the socially optimal production of qualities. The utility function

$$U(\theta, q) = \max\{\theta q - p, 0\}$$

is quasilinear and transferable. The social welfare is therefore defined by

$$W \equiv S + \pi_a + \pi_b$$

where the consumer surplus is defined by

$$\begin{aligned} S &\equiv \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} U(\theta, q) d\theta \\ &= \lim_{n_a, n_b \rightarrow \infty} \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}_1}^{\bar{\theta}} (\theta q_1 - p_1) d\theta + \sum_{i=2}^{n_a+n_b} \int_{\theta_i}^{\theta_{i-1}} (\theta q_i - p_i) d\theta \right] \end{aligned}$$

As a benchmark, let us first consider first the socially optimum, that is, the first-best assignment. As shown by Moorthy [1984], the social planner sets each price equal to each marginal cost $p_i^o = c(q_i)$, assigns the quality range $q^o \in \lim_{n_a, n_b \rightarrow \infty} [q_1, q_{n_a+n_b}] = [0, \bar{\theta}]$, and serves all consumers $\theta^o \in (\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta})$. Since the profits are zero, the social welfare is equivalent to the consumer surplus. This is computed by

$$W^o = S^o = \bar{\theta}^3/6 = 0.1667\bar{\theta}^3$$

Next, consider the interval competition in a duopoly. Straightforward calculations yield $S^* = 0.1004\bar{\theta}^3$. Hence, the social welfare in the interval competition is calculated by

$$W^* = (0.1004 + 0.0317 + 0.0240)\bar{\theta}^3 = 0.1561\bar{\theta}^3$$

On the other hand, in the single-product competition, the social welfare as the sum of the consumer surplus and the profits of firms A and B is calculated by

$$W^* = (0.0940 + 0.0328 + 0.0243) \bar{\theta}^3 = 0.1511\bar{\theta}^3$$

Comparing the two values, we can say the following:

Proposition 3 *When firms are allowed to offer an arbitrary number of qualities, both the consumer surplus and the social welfare are high in comparison to the single-quality duopoly.*

It is clear that the consumer surplus is higher in the interval competition although the profit of each multiproduct firm is lower because of the prisoner's dilemma shown in Proposition 2. Thus, Proposition 3 indicates that the positive effect on the consumer surplus is greater than the negative effect on profits.

Finally, we have somewhat similar results in the case of monopoly. When a monopolist is allowed to produce a range of qualities, he offers a quality range of $q^* \in [0, \bar{\theta}]$ and serves consumers in the range of $\theta^* \in [0.5\bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$. The social welfare as the sum of the consumer surplus and the profit is calculated by

$$W^* = (0.0417 + 0.0833) \bar{\theta}^3 = 0.1250\bar{\theta}^3$$

In comparison with a duopoly situation, consumers are less well off when the firm is better off. That is because multiproduct monopolists are able to exploit the consumer surplus more effectively than the multiproduct duopolists. However, for society as a whole, a monopoly is worse than a duopoly because of the absence of competition.

In the case of single-product monopoly under $\underline{\theta} < 0.5\bar{\theta}$, the monopolist provides the single quality $q_1^* = 0.667\bar{\theta}$ and serves consumers $\theta^* \in [0.667\bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$. The social welfare as the sum of the consumer surplus and profit is

$$W^* = (0.0370 + 0.0741) \bar{\theta}^3 = 0.1111\bar{\theta}^3$$

Thus, the single-product monopoly is shown to be in the worst interest for both consumers and the monopolist.

V. Conclusion

In this paper, we have analyzed a two-stage competition between multiproduct duopolists in which the firms compete in terms of the number of similar products and their qualities and then compete in terms of prices. We have clarified that the emergence of a multiproduct equilibrium crucially depends on the nature of quality improvement costs and the nature of the endogenous market coverage.

First, we showed that each firm must produce a single quality for any concave cost of quality improvement. This finding may justify the assumption of single-product firms under linear or zero costs of quality improvement. However, because, in reality, firms often offer multiple products, the linear or zero cost assumptions may be inappropriate in examining oligopolies in vertical product differentiation. Second, we focused on the strictly convex, that is, quadratic cost of quality improvement and showed that each firm chooses to offer an interval of qualities when the market is uncovered. This outcome is in sharp contrast with that in an exogenously covered market obtained in Champsaur and Rochet [1989, 1990]. Third, we showed that the low-quality firm produces a wider range of qualities and serves more consumers than the high-quality firm although the low-quality firm generates less profit. Finally, we verified the prisoner's dilemma: the profits of multiproduct duopolists are smaller than those of single-product duopolists. However, the former yields higher consumer surplus and higher social welfare as a result of interfirm competition. These findings contrast sharply with most of the current literature on the product differentiation, and may provide an explanation for the characteristics of the segmented market structures in the real world.

Our results were obtained using a specific model that made several assumptions on consumer preference and production technology; these assumptions are common in the literature on vertical product differentiation. One drawback of our model is that each firm is assumed to produce segmented qualities. However, qualities are not necessarily segmented; indeed, they are often entangled between firms in the real world.

Appendix 1: Concave Cost of Quality Improvement

Proposition 4 *If the unit cost of quality improvement is concave, each firm offers a single quality.*

This can be proven as follows. Substituting the prices (3) into (1), we have

$$(17) \quad \theta_i^* = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} \left[\bar{\theta} + \frac{c(q_i) - c(q_{i+1})}{q_i - q_{i+1}} \right] & \text{for } i = 1, 2, \dots, n_a - 1 \\ \frac{q_a [c(q_a) - c(q_b)]}{4q_a^2 - 5q_a q_b + q_b^2} - \frac{c(q_a) + 2(q_a - q_b)\bar{\theta}}{4q_a - q_b} & \text{for } i = n_a \\ \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{c(q_i) - c(q_{i+1})}{q_i - q_{i+1}} + \frac{2c(q_a) + c(q_b) + 2(q_a - q_b)\bar{\theta}}{4q_a - q_b} \right] & \text{for } i = n_a + 1, \dots, n_a + n_b - 1 \end{cases}$$

Then, in the second stage, the first-order condition of the top quality is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \pi_a^*}{\partial q_1} &= \frac{1}{4} \left[\bar{\theta} - \frac{c(q_1) - c(q_2)}{q_1 - q_2} \right] \left[\bar{\theta} - 2c'(q_1) + \frac{c(q_1) - c(q_2)}{q_1 - q_2} \right] \\ &> \frac{1}{4} \left[\bar{\theta} - \frac{c(q_1) - c(q_2)}{q_1 - q_2} \right] \left[\frac{c(q_1) - c(q_2)}{q_1 - q_2} - 2c'(q_1) + \frac{c(q_1) - c(q_2)}{q_1 - q_2} \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \left[\bar{\theta} - \frac{c(q_1) - c(q_2)}{q_1 - q_2} \right] \left[\frac{c(q_1) - c(q_2)}{q_1 - q_2} - c'(q_1) \right] \\ &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

where the first inequality is due to

$$x_1 = \frac{1}{2} \left[\bar{\theta} - \frac{c(q_1) - c(q_2)}{q_1 - q_2} \right] > 0 \iff \bar{\theta} - \frac{c(q_1) - c(q_2)}{q_1 - q_2}$$

and the second inequality is due to concavity of $c(q)$:

$$\frac{c(q_1) - c(q_2)}{q_1 - q_2} \geq c'(q_1)$$

That is, the top quality goes to infinity.⁹

⁹In order to avoid infinite quality, Choi and Shin [1992] and Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed [2006] assume an upper bound of q_i . However, assuming an upper bound should alter the assumption on the unit cost of quality improvement as follows

$$\begin{aligned} c'(q_i) &\geq 0, \quad c''(q_i) \leq 0 \text{ for } q_i \leq \bar{q} \\ c(q_i) &\text{ is suddenly very large for } q_i > \bar{q} \end{aligned}$$

This means that $c(q_i)$ is no more concave.

From (17), the demand for intermediate quality i ($= 2, 3, \dots, n_a - 1, n_a + 2, \dots, n_a + n_b - 1$) is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
x_i &= \theta_{i-1} - \theta_i \\
&= \frac{p_{i-1}^* - p_i^*}{q_{i-1}^* - q_i^*} - \frac{p_i^* - p_{i-1}^*}{q_i^* - q_{i-1}^*} \\
(18) \quad &= \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{c(q_{i-1}) - c(q_i)}{q_{i-1} - q_i} - \frac{c(q_i) - c(q_{i+1})}{q_i - q_{i+1}} \right]
\end{aligned}$$

Because the first term is the slope between points $(q_{i-1}, c(q_{i-1}))$ and $(q_i, c(q_i))$ and the second term is that between $(q_i, c(q_i))$ and $(q_{i+1}, c(q_{i+1}))$, their difference is non-positive for any concave $c(q_i)$ with $q_{i-1} > q_i > q_{i+1}$.

In addition, the demand of quality $n_a + n_b$ is rewritten as

$$x_{n_a+n_b} = \frac{q_{n_a+n_b-1} \left[\frac{c(q_{n_a+n_b-1})}{q_{n_a+n_b-1}} - \frac{c(q_{n_a+n_b})}{q_{n_a+n_b}} \right]}{2(q_{n_a+n_b-1} - q_{n_a+n_b})} \leq 0.$$

for any concave $c(q_i)$. Hence, we have shown that firm A produces at most two qualities and firm B at most one quality q_b .

It remains to show that $(n_a, n_b) = (2, 1)$ is not an SPNE. When $(n_a, n_b) = (2, 1)$, firm A optimizes q_1 and q_2 ($= q_a$). Since $\partial \pi_a^* / \partial q_1 > 0$, q_1^* is the maximum quality, which is denoted by \bar{q} . Let $q_2 = r\bar{q}$ and $q_3 = s\bar{q}$, where $0 < s < r < 1$. Then, the other first-order condition is given by

$$\frac{\partial \pi_a^*}{\partial q_2} = \frac{s^2(20r + s)\bar{\theta}^2 \bar{q}^2 + C(\bar{q})}{4(4r - s)^3 \bar{q}^2}$$

where

$$C(\bar{q}) \equiv \alpha_1(r, s)c(\bar{q})^2 + \alpha_2(r, s)c(\bar{q})\bar{q} + \alpha_3(r, s)c(\bar{q})c'(\bar{q})\bar{q} + \alpha_4(r, s)c'(\bar{q})\bar{q}^2$$

and $\alpha_i(r, s)$ are constants.

From concavity of $c(q)$, the degree of $C(\bar{q})$ is does not exceed two. When the degree is less than two,

$$\lim_{\bar{q} \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\partial \pi_a^*}{\partial q_2} = \frac{s^2(20r + s)\bar{\theta}^2}{4(4r - s)^3} > 0$$

Therefore, we have $q_2 \rightarrow \bar{q}$, which implies single-product outcome. When the degree is equal to two, the unit cost of quality improvement is linear $c(q) = \beta q$ ($\beta > 0$). Then, we get¹⁰

$$\frac{\partial \pi_a^*}{\partial q_2} = \frac{s^2(20r + s)(\bar{\theta} - \beta)^2}{4(4r - s)^3} > 0$$

Hence, we have therefore shown that the multiproduct duopoly setting ends up with the single-product duopoly.

Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 1

The first-order conditions are readily computed as¹¹

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \pi_a}{\partial p_1} &= \bar{\theta} - \frac{2p_1 - 2p_2 - c(q_1) + c(q_2)}{q_1 - q_2} = 0 \quad \text{for } i = 1 \\ \frac{\partial \pi_a}{\partial p_i} &= \frac{2p_{i-1} - 2p_i - c(q_{i-1}) + c(q_i)}{q_{i-1} - q_i} - \frac{2p_i - 2p_{i+1} - c(q_i) + c(q_{i+1})}{q_i - q_{i+1}} = 0 \quad \text{for } i = 2, \dots, n_a - 1 \\ \frac{\partial \pi_a}{\partial p_{n_a}} &= \frac{2p_{n_a-1} - 2p_{n_a} - c(q_{n_a-1}) + c(q_{n_a})}{q_{n_a-1} - q_{n_a}} - \frac{2p_{n_a} - p_{n_a+1} - c(q_{n_a})}{q_{n_a} - q_{n_a+1}} = 0 \quad \text{for } i = n_a \\ \frac{\partial \pi_b}{\partial p_{n_a+1}} &= \frac{p_{n_a} - 2p_{n_a+1} + c(q_{n_a+1})}{q_{n_a} - q_{n_a+1}} - \frac{2p_{n_a+1} - 2p_{n_a+2} - c(q_{n_a+1}) + c(q_{n_a+2})}{q_{n_a+1} - q_{n_a+2}} = 0 \quad \text{for } i = n_a + 1 \\ \frac{\partial \pi_b}{\partial p_i} &= \frac{2p_{i-1} - 2p_i - c(q_{i-1}) + c(q_i)}{q_{i-1} - q_i} - \frac{2p_i - 2p_{i+1} - c(q_i) + c(q_{i+1})}{q_i - q_{i+1}} = 0 \quad \text{for } i = n_a + 2, \dots, n_a + n_b - 1 \\ \frac{\partial \pi_b}{\partial p_{n_a+n_b}} &= \frac{2p_{n_a+n_b-1} - 2p_{n_a+n_b} - c(q_{n_a+n_b-1}) + c(q_{n_a+n_b})}{q_{n_a+n_b-1} - q_{n_a+n_b}} - \frac{2p_{n_a+n_b} - c(q_{n_a+n_b})}{q_{n_a+n_b}} = 0 \quad \text{for } i = n_a + n_b \end{aligned}$$

where the second and the fifth equations are ignored when $n_a = 2$ and $n_b = 2$.

From $\partial \pi_a / \partial p_i = 0$ ($i = 1, \dots, n_a - 1$), p_2, \dots, p_{n_a} can be successively expressed as a function of p_1 :

$$(19) \quad p_i = p_1 - \frac{1}{2} [c(q_1) - c(q_{n_a}) + (q_1 - q_{n_a})\bar{\theta}] \quad \text{for } i = 2, \dots, n_a$$

¹⁰Furthermore, because

$$\frac{\partial \pi_b^*}{\partial q_3} = \frac{s^2(4r - 7s)(\bar{\theta} - \beta)^2}{4(4r - s)^3} = 0$$

we obtain $q_1^*, q_2^* = \bar{q}$ and $q_3^* = 4\bar{q}/7$. This is shown by Choi and Shin [1992] assuming single-product duopoly.

¹¹If $n_a = 2$ and $n_b = 2$, the second and the fifth equations in the following are ignored.

From $\partial\pi_b/\partial p_i = 0$ ($i = n_a + 2, \dots, n_a + n_b$), $p_{n_a+1}, \dots, p_{n_a+n_b}$ are successively solved as a function of $p_{n_a+n_b}$:

$$(20) \quad p_i = \frac{1}{2} \left[c(q_i) + \frac{q_i}{q_{n_a+n_b}} (2p_{n_a+n_b} - c(q_{n_a+n_b})) \right] \text{ for } i = n_a + 1, \dots, n_a + n_b - 1$$

Plugging (19) and (20) into $\partial\pi_a/\partial p_{n_a} = \partial\pi_b/\partial p_{n_a+1} = 0$, we obtain p_1^* and $p_{n_a+n_b}^*$ as functions of q_i , n_a and n_b , respectively. Substituting them into (19) and (20) yields the equilibrium prices (3).

Because the profit functions are quadratic and concave in p_i , the second-order conditions are satisfied.

Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1

Because the unique solution given by (13) and Proposition 1 satisfies the $n_a + n_b$ first-order conditions, it is sufficient to show that both profit functions are concave in the neighborhood of $q_i = q_i^*$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n_a + n_b$. This can be confirmed by computing the Jacobian matrix of each profit function.

For firm A , by using (13), we have

$$(21) \quad \frac{\partial^2 \pi_a^*}{\partial q_i \partial q_j} = \begin{cases} -\frac{\bar{\theta} - q_a}{2(2n_a - 1)} & \text{for } i = j = 1, 2, \dots, n_a - 1 \\ \frac{\bar{\theta} - q_a}{4(2n_a - 1)} & \text{for } i = j \pm 1 \text{ and } i = 1, 2, \dots, n_a \\ 0 & \text{for } i = j \pm 2 \\ \frac{\partial f_A}{\partial q_a} & \text{for } i = j = n_a \end{cases}$$

Let J_i be the determinant of the i th principal minor of the Jacobian matrix given by (21). Suppose

$$(22) \quad |J_i| = (2i + 1) \left[\frac{-(\bar{\theta} - q_a)}{4(2n_a - 1)} \right]^i$$

holds for $i = k$. The following shows that it is true for $k = 1, 2$.

$$|J_1| = -\frac{3(\bar{\theta} - q_a)}{4(2n_a - 1)}; \quad |J_2| = \frac{5(\bar{\theta} - q_a)^2}{16(2n_a - 1)^2}$$

In addition, we can show that (22) also holds for $i = k + 1$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
|J_{k+1}| &= \frac{\partial^2 \pi_a^*}{\partial q_k^2} |J_k| - \left(\frac{\partial^2 \pi_a^*}{\partial q_k \partial q_{k-1}} \right)^2 |J_{k-1}| \\
&= (2k + 1) \left[\frac{-(\bar{\theta} - q_a)}{4(2n_a - 1)} \right]^k \left[\frac{-(\bar{\theta} - q_a)}{2(2n_a - 1)} \right] - (2k - 1) \left[\frac{-(\bar{\theta} - q_a)}{4(2n_a - 1)} \right]^{k-1} \left[\frac{(\bar{\theta} - q_a)}{4(2n_a - 1)} \right]^2 \\
&= [2(k + 1) + 1] \left[\frac{-(\bar{\theta} - q_a)}{4(2n_a - 1)} \right]^{k+1}
\end{aligned}$$

Hence, (22) holds for all $i = 1, 2, \dots, n_a - 1$. For $i = n_a \rightarrow \infty$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\lim_{n_a \rightarrow \infty} |J_{n_a}| &= \lim_{n_a \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\partial f_A}{\partial q_a} |J_{n_a-1}| - \left(\frac{\partial^2 \pi_a^*}{\partial q_{n_a} \partial q_{n_a-1}} \right)^2 |J_{n_a-2}| \\
&= \lim_{n_a \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\partial f_A}{\partial q_a} |J_{n_a-1}| - \left[\frac{(\bar{\theta} - q_a)}{4(2n_a - 1)} \right]^2 |J_{n_a-2}| \\
&\approx -0.147\bar{\theta} \lim_{n_a \rightarrow \infty} |J_{n_a-1}|
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the signs of $|J_{n_a}|$ and $|J_{n_a-1}|$ are opposite, and hence, $|J_i|$ is negative for all odd i and positive for all even i , verifying concavity near $q_i = q_i^*$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n_a$.

The similar proof is applied for firm B .

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